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Chapter 1
Framework and outline

FRAMEWORK AND OUTLINE 3
1.1 Observing preferences
Policymakers face the challenge of taking policy decisions with the aim to improve social welfare in the
economy. These policy decisions should be based on sound indicators of social welfare. There is a general
consensus that policymakers should respect the households’ judgments about their own lives (Fleurbaey
and Blanchet (2013)). These individual judgments can be understood as the households’ ‘true underlying
preferences’ (Qizilbash (2012)). One problem is that information on true underlying preferences is not
easy to obtain. In practice, one can only obtain information by observing preferences, either by relying
on revealed or stated preference approaches, or by relying on survey data –e.g. based on self-reported life
satisfaction. But what if these observed preferences are not a reflection of the individuals’ true underlying
preferences?
In (welfare) economics, true underlying preferences are assumed to be stable, consistent and context-
independent, and rational and perfectly informed households seek to satisfy these preferences (McQuillin
and Sugden (2012)). If these conventional assumptions are valid, then observed preferences reflect indi-
viduals’ true underlying preferences. There is compelling evidence, however, that observed preferences
can be flawed. Due to human limitations, an indivividual’s behaviour is not consistent with his true under-
lying preferences (Qizilbash (2012)). In this case, the idea of consumer sovereignty is false. Three broad
types of anomalies can be distinguished in this respect.
In the first type, households might be well-informed, but they do not act rationally, i.e. they do not
choose the best option given their true underlying preferences. This problem pertains to time inconsis-
tent behaviour, households take decisions today, but without fully considering their future. They engage
in unhealthy lifestyles (e.g. smoking, not doing sports, eating fat foods) or save insufficiently for their
pension. Households might know the long-run consequences of their behaviour, but postpone behavioural
change because they have the tendency to seek immediate gratification. They take repeated decisions with
small time intervals and the consequence of each decision is small, remote in time and still avoidable
today (Akerlof (1991)). In this case, the households’ true underlying preferences are not revealed by their
market behaviour.
Policymakers are aware of this and aim to discourage, restrict or even forbid certain behaviours or
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commodities. Goods the policymaker values higher (lower) than the households are called (de)merit
goods. High taxes on cigarettes and smoking bans in public places or subsidies for sports clubs can
be rationalized in this way. Policymakers nudge the households in a specific direction so that they act
according to their true underlying preferences. The general idea behind this type of policy is that the
policymaker aims to increase welfare, even if it is against the households’ observed preferences.
The second anomaly is due to a lack of information when individuals judge about their preferences,
also if they behave rationally. In some cases, individuals are badly positioned to cast a judgment. For
instance when individuals lack experience, their observed behaviour might reflect his lack of information
rather than his true preferences. Take the example of a student who has to judge about the content or the
quality of a course he has taken. As he does not yet know how the information provided in the course
could serve him in the future, his judgment will not reflect his true underlying preferences as he does not
know them.
The third type of anomaly has to do with a situation in which individuals might be rational and well-
informed, but their observed preferences are not stable, not consistent or context independent. Then people
fail when judging decisions or their life situation because their judgment is distorted. Many examples are
provided in the literature. Individuals have the tendency to over-weight low probabilities (McQuillin and
Sugden (2012)), they are bad in predicting future feelings and underestimate how easily they can adapt
to changes in their situation (Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013)), or focus too much on small details while
forgetting the bigger picture. For this reason, they badly organize activities, lose time or stick too often
with the status quo (Qizilbash (2012)). Observed preferences might also depend on the context in which
the individual finds himself, or on the framing of the choice problem. When asked to judge about their
situation, they might give too much weight to their current mood or their aspirations (see Fleurbaey and
Blanchet (2013)). As a consequence, information on individuals’ true underlying preferences is hard to
obtain.
Observed preferences differ from true underlying preferences in these cases. The conventional as-
sumptions stated above are then based on an unrealistic view on the nature of human beings. The policy-
maker should not base policy on observed preferences, but needs to correct in some way. In this situation,
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the policymaker is said to act as a paternalist. This dissertation deals with instances in which house-
holds’ observed preferences are mistaken and focuses on solutions for policymakers. The second chapter
deals with policy when households are not rational or well-informed. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on welfare
measurement.
1.2 Lack of rationality
Chapter 2 deals with indirect tax policy in the case where households’ revealed preferences fall short
of their true underlying preferences. Marginal costs of funds (MCF) are calculated for taxes on 13 com-
modities in Belgium, the consumption of which creates an environmental externality in the form of carbon
dioxide emissions. The MCF of an indirect tax measures the impact on social welfare of an increase of
that tax rate. Social welfare is the (weighted) sum of the utility levels of all households in the economy.
Social welfare can be increased in a revenue neutral way if the MCF differ numerically.
If observed preferences are to be respected, the MCF expressions contain two parts. The first one is
due to the impact of the tax increase on household utilities via their own consumption levels. It has been
proposed by Ahmad and Stern (1984). The impact of an indirect tax increase is measured based on the
budgets households spend on the taxed commodity. If a commodity is consumed more, its MCF is higher.
The second part is due to the impact of the tax increase on carbon dioxide emissions, which influences
the utilities of all households. The externality part has been analysed by Scho¨b (1996) and Mayeres and
Proost (2001) and measures the impact on household utilities due to the fact that they suffer from the
emissions, ideally based on their willingness to pay for a decrease in emissions. A commodity with high
carbon dioxide emissions has a lower MCF.
The problem is that households are unaware of the consequences of their emissions of carbon dioxide,
as they only appear in the long run. Their willingness to pay for a decrease in carbon dioxide emissions
is too low and thus the externality has demerit properties. Even if households were well informed, they
might postpone their efforts to cut down their emissions. Consequently, their consumption behaviour
does not reflect their true underlying preferences and this is an argument for the policymaker to intervene.
In the chapter, the consequence of this idea are investigated for the MCF expressions. The work is an
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extention of Schroyen (2010), who investigated the consequences of a private demerit good for the MCF
expressions. The incorporation of the demerit externality implies three extra terms in the MCF expression,
a direct effect, a scale effect and an income effect. The direct effect takes into account the fact that the
externality is valued higher. The scale effect takes into account the fact that, due to demerit arguments,
households are considered worse off than they think they are, and as a consequence their valuations of
all commodities need to be adapted. The income effect is due to the fact that household utility counts
relatively less from the point of view of the policymaker, as the externality is not valued sufficiently. The
empirical findings for Belgium suggest that a revenue neutral tax reform can be achieved by increasing
the indirect taxes on electricity, meat & fish, gas and fuels for heating, and decreasing the indirect taxes
on clothing & shoes, durables, food & beverages.
1.3 Welfare measurement
Chapter 3 and 4 deal with measurement of respectively job quality and well-being. Job quality and
well-being are essentially multidimensional concepts. In some cases it is necessary to calculate a one-
dimensional measure, such that weights need to be attached to the different dimensions. There are two
attractive principles such a measure can satisfy: respect for preferences and dominance. Respect for
preferences means that the weights are determined based on preferences. Then the policymaker respects
the trade-offs individuals make between the dimensions. The domininance principle means that the one-
dimenional measure increases in all underlying dimensions. Fleurbaey et al. (2009) argue that, as it is
impossible to satisfy both principles at the same time, a choice has to be made for one of the two. Either
the dominance principle or the respect for preferences principle has to be sacrificed.
1.3.1 Lack of information
Chapter 3 deals with job quality measurement for 2310 individuals who entered the labour market in
Flanders. A job is described in terms of the achievement of five job characteristics: income, the extent
to which the job is physically demanding, skill utilization, work endeavour and autonomy. Individuals in
their first job might behave rationally, but they might be ill-informed to judge about the quality of their
jobs. For this reason, their observed preferences might not reflect their true underlying preferences. It is
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argued in the chapter that in this case, one should use a job quality measure satisfying dominance, and
sacrifice the respect for preferences principle. The output distance function is used to measure job quality.
It is a concept commonly used to analyse firm efficiency. Lovell et al. (1994) have proposed to use the
distance function as a measure of well-being. The achieved bundle is compared to a specific maximal
attainable bundle of job characteristics, consequently, job quality is measured as a percentage. Evidently,
this measure satisfies the dominance principle.
The aim of the chapter is to use the calculated job qualities to measure inequality of opportunity at
job market entry. To do this, job quality is related to two types of personal characteristics: circumstances
and efforts. Circumstances are personal characteristics he is not held responsible for, such as his gender
or the education level of his parents. Efforts are characteristics the individual is held responsible for,
for instance his own education level. Inequality of opportunity is measured as the percentage inequality
would be reduced if all individuals had the same circumstances. The difference between these two can
only be due to unequal opportunities. The results suggest that around 13% of observed inequality is due to
inequality of circumstances, whereas income inequality would be reduced with 4-8% if all circumstances
had been equal.
1.3.2 Affects and cognition
The fourth chapter in this dissertation deals with obtaining information on true underlying preferences
from survey data, necessary for the calculation of equivalent income. An individual’s life is described
as the achievement of a number of functionings, such as health or material living standards. Equivalent
income is the level of income that, given reference values for the other dimensions of functionings, makes
an individual indifferent to his actual situation. This concept has been proposed by Fleurbaey et al. (2009),
it respects preferences, but does not satisfy the dominance criterion.
The dimensions of functionings dealt with in the chapter are based on Stiglitz et al. (2009): income,
health, education, personal activities including work, social connections and relationships and living envi-
ronment. Information on preferences for dimensions of functionings is usually derived from the answers
individuals provide to one or more overarching life evaluation questions. A common approach in the lit-
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erature is to ask people to evaluate their life satisfaction on a scale from zero to ten. In the survey used
in the chapter, the question goes as follows: “How satisfied are you with your life as a whole, on a scale
from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10 (excellent)”. There are two basic problems concerning the use of
raw data on life satisfaction.
The first problem is related to the physical condition neglect of satisfaction information (Sen (1980
and 1985)): the mental state of the individual does not say anything per se about his physical condition.
People may adapt their aspirations to their life situation and state to be relatively satisfied when they
are income poor or in bad health. The second problem has to do with the fact that the answers people
provide to the self-reported satisfaction question are a mixture of two things: a cognitive judgment –what
people think of their life– and an affective judgment –how people feel in their life (Fleurbaey and Blanchet
(2013)). Information on true underlying preferences should be based on the former, not on the latter, as
affective information might be influenced by moods –which are typically short-lived.
Consequently, in order to get information on the cognitive evaluation of the individuals, which provide
information on their true underlying preferences, the effects of aspirations and affects have to be filtered.
The equivalent income approach does this, on the condition that what remains after filtering is cognitive
information on the individual’s life. Fleurbaey et al. (2009) assume that aspirations depend on individual
characteristics such as the individuals’ age or gender.
If another overarching life evaluation question can be found that depends less on affects and aspira-
tions, it might provide a less biased picture on the individuals’ true underlying preferences, as no correc-
tion for affects and aspirations is needed. McQuillin and Sugden (2012) argue that it could be interesting
to identify another object of value, assign normative value to it, and try to measure it to obtain information
on preferences. In the chapter it is investigated whether the concept of self-reported possibilities, which
measures the extent to which individuals have the ability to strive for whatever they want, provides more
reliable information. The question goes as follows: “How are the possibilities for you, in general, on a
scale from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10 (excellent)”. It is shown that the answers to this question are
less sensitive for the individuals’ mood of the day or their aspirations. As such, they might come closer
to a cognitive evaluation of the individuals’ lives. Self reported possibilities could provide less biased
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information on true underlying preferences than self-reported life satisfaction.
The survey contains, apart from information on individual characterstics, also information on the indi-
viduals’ personality and their mood of the day. The approach of Fleurbaey et al. (2009) is followed. Direct
effects of these variables are assumed to reflect differences in aspirations and affects, the interactions of
these variables with the functionings dimensions are assumed to provide information on the individuals’
true preferences. Equivalent income is calculated based on life satisfaction and possibilities and compared
with income and the answers people provide on the life satisfaction and possibilities questions.
The two equivalent income measures are very similar, their correlation is around 90%. This suggests
that both concepts provide information on the individuals’ true underlying preferences. It is argued that, as
self-reported possibilities are less sensitive for adaptive preferences, they are less biased than self-reported
satisfaction. It is shown that the correlations between the equivalent income measures and observed
income are rather low. Consequently, income falls short as a measure to determine who is to be considered
poor. Both self-reported satisfaction and self-reported possibilities correlate highly with the equivalent
income measures, though the correlations with self-reported possibilities are higher.
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Chapter 2
Marginal Cost of Indirect Taxation in
the presence of a Demerit Externality:
Application to CO2 emissions
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2.1 Introduction
This paper deals with indirect tax policy design when there is an externality (CO2) related with energy
use that is undervalued by consumers. Because consumers focus too much on the present, the (long run)
consequences of CO2 are insufficiently taken into account when they decide upon consumption today.
The households suffer some negative effects of the externality, but not all of the effects. The planner
(i.e. the government) knows this and aims at correcting this problem by altering indirect tax rates. In the
economic jargon, CO2 is seen as a demerit good.
The analysis is performed using the concept of the marginal cost of funds (MCF ) of indirect taxation.
This is the social welfare cost of raising one euro of tax money by increasing a specific indirect tax rate.
The literature in this field originated from the seminal paper of Ahmad and Stern (1984). In that contri-
bution, only private commodities were considered. Externalities were taken into account in subsequent
studies, e.g. Scho¨b (1996) or Mayeres and Proost (2001) who considered the effects on pollution and
traffic congestion. In all of this literature, the planner endorses consumer sovereignty. Public and private
goods are only valuable for society to the extent that households value them, based on observed behaviour.
Private goods are valued using the market price, public goods are valued using the sum of the willingness
to pay of all households.
In some cases, however, households’ ‘true’ preferences may not be revealed by their behaviour and
governments do not accept consumer sovereignty. This applies to carbon dioxide emissions as well. The
chosen consumption bundle is not the one consumers truly prefer when the consequences of CO2 are not
fully taken into account in their decisions. Take the example of transport. Workers choose between their
bike and their car to go to work, say for a short distance. They know that the choice for the latter causes
more carbon dioxide emissions than the choice for the former, but this only plays a minor role in their
decision-making process. As a consequence, they choose to use their car too often. The consequences for
carbon dioxide emissions are not taken into account sufficiently, although when asked about it, individuals
acknowledge that these consequences are real and important. They may intend to change their behaviour
- tomorrow. They are aware of the fact that long run costs of emitting CO2 exceed the benefits, but they
0I would like to thank Dirk Van de gaer for constructive comments on preliminary versions of this paper and Brent Bleys and
An-Sofie Cottyn, two of my colleagues, for making linguistic suggestions and corrections.
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procrastinate to change their behaviour because they have a tendency to seek immediate gratification.
Short run costs and benefits have undue salience over long run costs and benefits (see Akerlof (1991),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001)).
An important feature of this type of behaviour is that individuals take repeated decisions (e.g. to use
the car to go to work) with small time intervals and that the consequences of each decision are small, re-
mote in time and still avoidable today (Akerlof, 1991). Because of this, the households’ ‘true’ preferences
are not revealed by market behaviour. The assumption of rational, forward looking, utility maximizing
households is violated and there is a reason for the planner to intervene. Governments aim to discourage,
restrict or even forbid the consumption of demerit goods1 like tobacco because they want to protect indi-
viduals against illness at old age. In a number of recent contributions (Schroyen, 2005 and 2010), MCF
expressions for indirect taxes have been derived for an economy in which there is a private commodity
with demerit properties (e.g. cigarettes, hard drugs...).
In this paper, Schroyen’s model is extended to include an externality with demerit properties. The
model is applied to CO2 emissions as demerit externality. Apart from the externality correction, the
planner has to correct the MCF for demerit considerations as well. There is an important distinction
between these two. If the externality problem is solved, on average the households gain (today). This
does not hold for the demerit problem, because from the households’ point of view, the planner corrects
too much. As such, this paper is about applied paternalism. The planner acts against the short-run interest
of the households today because he believes their short-run preferences are mistaken.
Based on observed behaviour the valuation of one tonne of CO2 is too low, energy intensive com-
modities are valued too highly. The planner knows this and aims at changing relative prices in order to
make sure households change their behaviour today. He wants to influence current consumption decisions
by putting a higher value on a tonne of carbon dioxide, i.e. by considering it as a demerit good, such that
a commodity that has a higher impact on CO2 is valued lower. This is the ‘direct’ correction for demerit
considerations that will be derived in this paper. Apart from this first result, there are two other results
1The term (de)merit good is due to Musgrave (1959). According to him, merit and demerit goods are goods for which the preference
of the planner differs from the preference of the households. The planner attributes a higher value than the household(s) to merit
goods and a lower value to demerit goods. Other demerit arguments in the literature are uncertainty, irrational preferences and
information deficiency (e.g. myopia, ignorance).
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in the derivation below that are somewhat less intuitive. The second correction is a valuation effect due
to an income effect. Because the households suffer more from the externality than they are aware of, the
planner evaluates them as if they are on a lower utility level. As a consequence, the households’ valuations
for all commodities change, as households’ willingness to pay for commodities depends on how well-off
they are. The third correction has to do with the fact the planner takes into account an externality effect
that was not sufficiently taken into account before. As a consequence, household utility counts relatively
less. Only a specific percentage of the households’ commodity valuations is considered valuable from a
social point of view. These are the three consequences of the demerit considerations for the MCF that
are derived below. In the empirical section, the MCF of indirect taxes on 13 commodities are calculated
for Belgium.
In the next section, it is shown formally how the planner’s valuation of a commodity differs from
the household’s valuation. Then the MCF of indirect taxation are derived. The third section applies
the framework to Belgian indirect taxes in the presence of carbon dioxide emissions. The fourth section
concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Notation and household behaviour
Assume there are n households, M commodities and an externality (E) in the economy. Household h’s
consumption of commodity j is xhj ∈ R+ and his expenditurs are mh ∈ R+. It consumes a commodity
vector xh ∈ RM+ , xh = [xh1 , ..., xhM ]. The vector collecting the consumption of commodity j is xj ∈ Rn+,
xj = [x
1
j , ..., x
n
j ]. Finally, x ∈ RMn+ is the M × n dimensional matrix of commodity consumption by
all households. The externality E is created by total household consumption of commodities: E (x) :
RMn+ → R+. Household h has a quasi-concave utility function uh
(
xh;E
)
: RM+ × R+ → R increasing
in all xhj and decreasing in E. The after tax price of commodity j is qj and pj is the pre tax price of
commodity j, which is assumed to be fixed for all j. The indirect tax on commodity j is tj , so qj = pj+tj
(qj , pj ∈ R+ and tj ∈ R). The vector q = [q1, ..., qM ] is the vector of commodity prices. Household h’s
Marshallian demand for commodity j is xhj
(
q,mh;E
)
. The household’s marginal utility of (one euro of)
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income is αh ∈ R+.
Each household h solves the following problem
Max uh
(
xh;E
)
s.t.
M∑
j=1
qjx
h
j = m
h. (1)
It decides upon the amount of private commodities it consumes, taking into account the impact of its
decisions on E. The first order conditions can be written as
qj =
∂uh(xh;E)
∂xhj
+
∂uh(xh;E)
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
αh
, for all j = 1, ...,M .
The right hand side of this expression measures household h’s willingness to pay for a unit of commodity
j, it is the household’s valuation of xhj in the optimum. Call it q
h
j
(
xh;E
)
:
qhj
(
xh;E
) ≡ ∂u
h(xh;E)
∂xhj
+
∂uh(xh;E)
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
αh
, for all j = 1, ...,M . (2)
The numerator is the household’s marginal utility of consumption of commodity i. Note that the household
takes into account the impact of its consumption of xhj on E on its own utility only, not the impact on
others.
For future reference, define
qhE
(
xh;E
) ≡ ∂uh(xh;E)∂E
αh
, for all h, (3)
household h’s marginal willingness to pay for a unit of the externality. As the numerator is negative,
qhE
(
xh;E
)
< 0.
2.2.2 The planner
The planner does not agree with the households’ valuations of commodities and E for two reasons: the
existence of an externality and the existence of demerit arguments. First we deal with the externality. The
planner aims to maximise social welfare, not just individual h’s welfare. Assume that the planner has the
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following objective function:
W (x;E) =
n∑
h=1
λhuh
(
xh;E
)
.
To the extent that one household’s behaviour influences other households’ utilities, adjustments are needed.
This is the standard externality correction (see e.g. Pigou (1947) or Cornes and Sandler (1996)). If house-
hold h consumes an extra unit of commodity j, the impact on social welfare is
∂W (x;E)
∂xhj
= λh
(
∂uh
(
xh;E
)
∂xhj
+
∂uh
(
xh;E
)
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
)
+
n∑
l=1
l 6=h
λl
∂ul
(
xl;E
)
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
.
Demerit arguments are not yet included. This brings us with the second correction the planner per-
forms. Household welfare is not perceived in the same way by the government as by the household due to
demerit arguments. To incorporate this, assume the planner evaluates household h’s situation with another
utility function:
u˜
(
xh;E
)
. (4)
This function is such that u˜
(
xh;E
)
:RM+ ×R+ → R. It will be used in the social welfare function instead
of uh
(
xh;E
)
. We impose a formal relationship between u˜
(
xh;E
)
and uh
(
xh;E
)
. One approach to take
into account demerit arguments has been formalised by Schroyen (see Schroyen (2005) and Schroyen
(2010)), for a private (de)merit good. He proposes a scaling approach to commodity consumption. He
uses the distance function dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
: RM+ × R× R+ → R+ (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)),
which is implicitly defined by
uh
 xh
dh
(
xh, uh;E
) ; E
dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
 = uh. (5)
The distance dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
is the amount by which private consumption and E need to be scaled to
reach a reference utility level uh. If xh and E happen to be on the indifference curve corresponding to
uh, dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
= 1. The planner disagrees with the amount dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
because of demerit
arguments. He believes that, in order to reach the reference utility level, commodity consumption and
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E need to be scaled by a different amount dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
: RM+ × R× R+ → R+. As in Schroyen
(2010), we assume that the planner uses the following formal relationship between dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
and
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
:
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
= dh
(
xh, uh;E
)
+ eE, (6)
with e < 0 a public demerit parameter for the externality with the dimension of a normalised price (a
price relative to income). It measures how much the household should value one unit of externality E as a
percentage of income, on top of its private valuation. It is shown in appendix D that the formal relationship
between u˜
(
xh;E
)
and uh
(
xh;E
)
is
u˜
(
xh;E
)
= uh
(
xh
1− eE ;
E
1− eE
)
= uh
(
x̂h; Ê
)
(7)
with x̂h =
xh
1− eE and Ê =
E
1− eE .
This is the counterpart of expression (8) in Schroyen (2010) on page 46. The planner evaluates the
household at a different (lower) utility level because there are demerit arguments which the household
does not take into account.2 The planner’s objective changes into
W (x;E) =
n∑
h=1
λhu˜
(
xh;E
)
=
n∑
h=1
λhuh
(
x̂h; Ê
)
.
This expression has two relevant aspects, for our purposes. First of all, it is suited to take into account the
externality: each household’s behaviour influences other households’ utilities. Secondly, due to demerit
2Expression (2), household h’s willingness to pay for a unit of commodity j, could now be writ-
ten from the point of view of the planner. Making use of expression A7 in appendix A:
1
αh
[(
∂uh
(
x̂h;Ê
)
∂x̂hj
+
∂uh
(
x̂h;Ê
)
∂Ê
∂E
∂xhj
)
1
1−eE +
(∑M
l=1
∂uh
(
x̂h;Ê
)
∂x̂h
l
xhl +
∂uh
(
x̂h;Ê
)
∂Ê
E
)
e
(1−eE)2
∂E
∂xhj
]
.
In the appendix, this expression is used to derive the marginal cost of funds expressions by taking into account not only the effect
on household h’s utility, but the effect on all other households’ utilities.
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arguments, the households’ ‘adapted’ utilities are used instead of their ‘experienced’ utilities. In appendix
A, these two aspects are distinguished. The complication of the model is the fact that each household’s
behaviour implies an effect on each of the other households’ adapted utilities in a non-trivial way.
2.2.3 Marginal cost of funds derivation
Now we are ready to derive the marginal cost of funds expressions. The planner decides about indirect
tax rates t and has a revenue constraint R (t). The planner’s aim is to maximise social welfare such that
the revenue constraint is satisfied, he maximises
W (t) =
n∑
h=1
λhuh
(
x̂h (t) ; Ê
)
(8)
such that
R (t) = R+
M∑
i=1
n∑
h=1
tix
h
i (9)
with R exogenous revenue. The marginal cost of funds of the tax on commodity i is
MCFi = −
∂W (t)
∂ti
∂R(t)
∂ti
. (10)
It measures the marginal impact on social welfare of raising additional revenue by increasing the tax on
commodity i. If the marginal cost of funds of two commodities differs, say for commodities MCFi >
MCFj , then a budget neutral welfare improving tax reform can be realized by increasing the tax on
commodity j and decreasing the tax on commodity i.
First we calculate ∂R∂ti . We assume horizontal supply curves, resulting in fixed producer prices;
∂xhj
∂ti
=
∂xhj
∂qi
for all i, j, h.
∂R (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
h=1
xhi +
M∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
tj
∂xhj
∂qi
.
Now we multiply with qi and transform derivates into elasticities to obtain the following standard
expression:
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∂R (t)
∂ti
qi =
n∑
h=1
xhi qi +
M∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
tj
qj
qjx
h
j ε
h
ji, (11)
where εhji =
∂xhj
∂qi
qi
xhj
.
The numerator of the marginal cost of funds formula, multiplied by qi is
∂W (t)
∂ti
qi =
n∑
h=1
∂uh
(
x̂h (t) ; Ê
)
∂ti
qi.
The expression for ∂W (t)∂ti is derived in appendix A as expression (A22), here repeated for convenience:
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
qj
∂xlj
∂qi
+ qlE
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 (1 + eE)
+
n∑
l=1
Λl
e(ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
))
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+ eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 , (12)
in which Λl = λlαl, the planner’s welfare weight for household l. In the third line, slj and s
l
E measure
the impact on household l’s marginal utility of commodity j and the marginal utility of E respectively, if
the household is given 1 percent extra of all commodities and suffers 1 percent extra E, see expressions
(B3) and (B6) in appendix B. Dividing the terms by αl, household l’s marginal utility of income, yields
a value in euro:
slj
αl
measures the change in household l’s willingness to pay for commodity j (in euro) if
the household is given 1 percent extra of all commodities and suffers one percent extra E. If
slj
αl
is positive
(negative), it means that household l’s willingness to pay for commodity j increases (decreases) when
it becomes better-off. It plays an important role because it measures to what extent the valuations of all
commodities have to be altered if the planner evaluates the households to be worse off than they consider
themselves to be. In table 1, numerical values σj are provided, expressed as elasticities3.
3See appendix C: σlj =
slj
αlqj
.
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The interpretation of expression (12) goes as follows. First, start from a situation without demerit
arguments, e = 0. Then only the part in square brackets on the first line remains, measuring the total
impact on household l’s utility of the increase in ti. It is a combination of two terms. The first one is
the private impact of the increase in ti. It is the term that appears in Ahmad & Stern (1984) as well and
measures the impact of the increase in ti on household l’s utility, which is negative. The impact on the
household’s utility is valued using the market prices q. The second term in the first line has to do with the
externality. If ti increases, the behaviour of all other households h changes, which in turn influences E.
Each extra unit of E is valued using household l’s private valuation qlE < 0. Imagine that a tax increase
has a negative impact on the externality. In that case ∂W (t)∂ti is smaller in absolute value, such that the
societal cost of an increase in ti decreases, as expected.
If there are demerit arguments (e < 0), three types of corrections can be seen in the expression. We
will deal with them subsequently. First of all, the first line is multiplied with (1 + eE) < 1. Every unit of
private utility counts for (1 + eE) units of social utility. The part eE has the dimension of a budget share,
measuring the total demerit value of the externality, expressed as a percentage of income. For this reason
(1 + eE) is the share of the households’ private commodity valuation the planner takes into account. If
the demerit arguments are greater, the households’ private utility counts relatively less. Note that, because
all the MCF are multiplied with the same number, this term does not cause any changes in their rank in
itself, but decreases the absolute differences between the MCF of different commodities.
The parameter e appears in the second line of the expression as well. As in the first line, the part∑n
h=1
∑M
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
measures the impact on E due to the change in ti. Each extra realised tonne of CO2
is valued by e
(
ml + qlE
(
E −∑Mk=1 ∂E∂xlk xlk)), measuring how much extra the planner values a unit of
E for household l (on top of qlE).
4 As such, it strengthens the effect of the second term in the first line.
Imagine again that an increase in ti decreases the amount of E. In that case the second line is positive, so
∂W (t)
∂ti
is smaller in absolute value and the MCFi is lower. This is what is termed the ‘direct’ effect in the
4This term is expressed in euro. Remember that the demerit value of the externality e is expressed as a percentage of income. If
it is multiplied with income, we get a value in euro. The term ml + qlE
(
E −∑Mk=1 ∂E∂xl
k
xlk
)
can be seen as household l’s
income incorporating the value of the externality, as qlE
(
E −∑Mk=1 ∂E∂xl
k
xlk
)
< 0 measures the value for household l of other
households’ emissions (see Cornes & Sandler (1996) who view externalities created by others as an amount of income for the
individual).
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introduction of this paper.
The last line of the expression is the ‘scale’ effect, the correction for the fact that the planner evaluates
the households as worse off than they consider themselves to be. Households are evaluated at a distance
eE from the utility level they consider themselves to be at and because of this commodity valuations need
to be adjusted. The terms
slj
αl
and s
l
E
αl
measure how much the valuations of commodities and E change
due to a one percent distance from the welfare level they consider themselves to be at. The first term in
square brackets in the last line takes into account the change in the valuation of private commodities. In
the empirical section this part will prove to have considerable influence on the rank of MCF .
The second term in the third line takes into account the impact on the valuation of the externality. It
depends on s
l
E
αl
, measuring the change in the households’ valuation of E when they are put on a different
utility level. The sign of slE depends on the way households at different utility levels value the externality.
If better-off households value the externality higher, the sign is negative (note that qlE < 0).
2.3 Empirical application
2.3.1 The data
In the empirical application marginal cost of funds are calculated for indirect taxes on 13 commodities
in Belgium, using expression (C3) from appendix C, a simplified version of expression (12). Seven
categories of information are needed: data on budget shares for 10 income deciles, the valuation of the
externality, the total amount of carbon dioxide emission E, welfare weights, information on the impact of
commodity consumption on E, price and cross price elasticities, and scale elasticities.
The 2004 household budget survey provides information on budgets spent on each of these 13 com-
modities. Table 1 contains information on the indirect tax rates on each of the commodities, the impact on
CO2 emissions of a 1000 euro increase of the expenditures on each of the commodities and their budget
shares.
There are 10 household income categories and there are on average 2.33 individuals per household,
which means that every income decile in Belgium consists of roughly 450 000 households. The value
for qhE is based on the value of one ton of carbon dioxide at the world level, assumed at 20 euro per
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Table 1: Data
cat. commodity short tax% tiqi CO2/1000erj Budget shares wj
1 Alcohol & Tobacco AT 0.431 0.433 0.031
2 Food & Beverage FB 0.058 0.392 0.088
3 Meat & Fish MF 0.060 0.923 0.039
4 Clothing & Shoes CL 0.172 0.100 0.047
5 Rent & Water RW 0.046 0.362 0.215
6 Electricity EL 0.186 1.768 0.021
7 Gas GA 0.181 1.376 0.014
8 Other fuels (heating) FU 0.209 1.181 0.009
9 Durables DU 0.174 0.315 0.050
10 Services SE 0.152 0.127 0.353
11 Car Purchase CP 0.169 0.194 0.055
12 Car Use CU 0.500 4.965 0.072
13 Public Transport PT 0.057 0.202 0.007
ton. We want to know the valuation at the level of a Belgian income decile. This is calculated based on
the assumption that the income elasticity of this valuation equals 1. This amounts to an average value of
around 0.5 eurocents per Belgian income decile. The value for E is the total amount of CO2 emission
at the world level. The welfare weights are determined using the formula used by Ahmad & Stern:
Λl =
(
m1
mh
)υ
, with υ ≥ 0 a measure of inequality aversion and m1 the income of the poorest decile.
In the simulations the value for υ is taken to be equal to one.5 Information on the impact of commodity
consumption on the externality (for rhj in expression C3) is calculated from input-output analysis based on
data from Belgostat (National Bank of Belgium) and from data on the amount of carbon dioxide emission
per production sector.
Finally, price elasticities are derived from the estimation of a linearised almost ideal demand system
(see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). National accounts data and price data for 54 years (1953 - 2009)
are used to estimate the system of 12 budget share equations (as a SUR model, see Greene (2008)). A
restricted feasible GLS is estimated and iterated with the variance-covariance matrix of the previous step
used as weights in the next step. When estimating the demand system, the compensated own price elas-
ticities of four commodity categories (alcohol & tobacco, meat & fish, other fuels and durables) appeared
to be positive. This is inconsistent with demand theory, so four extra constraints have been added to the
demand system, setting these compensated demand elasticities equal to 0. The scale elasticities are calcu-
lated from the compensated price elasticity matrix based on a procedure put forward by Schroyen (2010).
The estimation procedure is described in appendix E and the results can be found in appendix F.
5This implies weights between 1 (for the poorest household) and 0.25 (for the richest household). Sensitivity analysis with values
of υ between 0 and 2 implies no considerable impact on the results.
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Sensitivity analysis is performed for different values of e. As a reference, the IPCC calculations are
based on damage estimates for a tonne of CO2 between 6 euro and 400 euro (see e.g. Tol (2005) and
Tol (2011)), so this will be the range for the simulations in this paper. In our base case, the value of one
tonne of carbon dioxide emissions is equal to 20 euro (or 0.5 eurocents per income decile). The parameter
e is varied so as to reflect the differences in valuation of E, simulations are performed with values of e
as a multiple of the average value of a tonne of carbon dioxide. It has the dimension of a price relative
to income. The parameter e ranges from zero to 20 times the average valuation of one unit of E as a
percentage of income,
piE =
∑n
l=1 q
l
E∑n
l=1m
l
.
This implies that the value of a tonne of carbon dioxide in the simulations lies between 20 euro and 420
euro. For these values, eE lies between 0 and −0.205, so 1 + eE is between 1 and 0.795, or, for the most
extreme value of e, the planner considers the households to be 20.5% worse off.
Three simplifying assumptions are made for the calculation of the MCF : first, price and cross price
elasticities are the same for all households: εhji = εji for all h. Second, it is assumed that the impact on
E of commodity consumption is the same for all households: rhj = rj for all h, and third, it is assumed
that the scale elasticities are the same for all households and that σE , the scale elasticity of E, equals -1.
The numerator of the MCF is expression (C3) in the appendix.
2.3.2 Results
The results are shown in table 2 below in which the contribution of each component of theMCF is shown.
The situation without demerit arguments is shown on the left side of the table. Numerically, only the part
due to Ahmad and Stern (1984) plays a role because all terms incorporating the externality (the second
term in the first line of expression (12)) are close to 0. This means that the externality does not matter
much for a planner who accepts consumer sovereignty. As we move to the right in the table, demerit
arguments start to play a role. These entail a number of rank switches that we will focus on.
The incorporation of demerit considerations has a multiplicative effect on each of the marginal costs
of funds (see expression (12)). For each value of e < 0 there are four columns: each first and second
column provide the rank of commodities and their marginal costs of funds taking into account the three
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corrections (columns ‘rank’ and ‘MCF ’ respectively). Each third and fourth column (labelled ‘direct’ and
‘scale’ respectively) provides numerical information on the impact of the demerit arguments of the second
and the third line of expression (12). Remember that the correction of the first line of expression (12) only
decreases the relative importance of private utility, no rank switches are caused by this correction. The
only consequence is that it diminishes the difference between the MCF of different commodities6. In the
other two columns it can be seen clearly that the direct impact of the demerit arguments is numerically
small, all rank switches are caused by the scale part. All direct demerit effects have a negative impact on
the MCF . It makes the societal costs of an indirect tax increase slightly smaller.
Table 2
e = 0 e = 4piE e = 8piE e = 12piE e = 20piE
rank MCF rank MCF direct scale rank MCF direct scale rank MCF direct scale rank MCF direct scale
EL 0.900 CU 0.803 -0.0009 0.133 CU 0.901 -0.0018 0.265 CU 1.001 -0.0027 0.398 CU 1.215 -0.0044 0.664
CU 0.699 AT 0.777 -0.0001 0.111 AT 0.860 -0.0002 0.223 AT 0.942 -0.0003 0.334 AT 1.108 -0.0004 0.557
AT 0.694 EL 0.775 -0.0003 -0.089 DU 0.704 -0.0001 0.111 DU 0.733 -0.0002 0.167 CL 0.870 -0.0001 0.459
GA 0.678 DU 0.675 -0.0001 0.056 CL 0.658 -0.0000 0.184 CL 0.723 -0.0000 0.276 DU 0.791 -0.0003 0.278
MF 0.664 MF 0.614 -0.0001 -0.023 EL 0.649 -0.0006 -0.178 EL 0.523 -0.0009 -0.267 SE 0.517 -0.0001 0.142
DU 0.646 GA 0.609 -0.0001 -0.040 MF 0.564 -0.0003 -0.046 MF 0.514 -0.0004 -0.068 FB 0.440 -0.0002 0.064
CP 0.641 CP 0.590 -0.0000 -0.025 GA 0.541 -0.0002 -0.080 SE 0.499 -0.0000 0.085 MF 0.414 -0.0007 -0.114
RW 0.541 CL 0.587 -0.0000 0.092 CP 0.539 -0.0000 -0.049 CP 0.488 -0.0001 -0.074 PT 0.389 -0.0001 0.087
CL 0.517 RW 0.508 -0.0000 -0.010 SE 0.490 -0.0000 0.057 GA 0.473 -0.0003 -0.120 CP 0.386 -0.0001 -0.124
FU 0.476 SE 0.481 -0.0000 0.029 RW 0.476 -0.0001 -0.021 FB 0.453 -0.0001 0.039 RW 0.378 -0.0002 -0.052
FB 0.472 FB 0.465 -0.0000 0.013 FB 0.459 -0.0001 0.026 RW 0.443 -0.0001 -0.031 GA 0.337 -0.0006 -0.201
SE 0.472 PT 0.382 -0.0000 0.017 PT 0.384 -0.0000 0.035 PT 0.386 -0.0001 0.052 EL 0.271 -0.0015 -0.444
PT 0.381 FU 0.372 -0.0002 -0.084 FU 0.268 -0.0003 -0.168 FU 0.165 -0.0005 0.252 FU -0.043 -0.0008 -0.421
Households are evaluated by the planner at a lower utility level, which changes their willingness to
pay for each commodity. If the scale elasticity is positive (negative), the household’s willingness to pay
decreases (increases) on this lower utility level. In table 1 numerical values can be found for the scale
elasticity for each commodity. The scale elasticities of six commodities are positive (electricity, gas, meat
& fish, car purchase, other fuels and rent & water). The rank of the MCF of these commodities decrease
as the value of e goes up. The reason is that the households’ valuation of these commodities is considered
to be lower, because of this the marginal cost of funds decreases. It is less costly for society to increase
the tax on them when demerit arguments play a role, because households’ valuation of these commodities
are lower.
For the seven other commodities (car use, alcohol & tobacco, durables, clothing & shoes, food &
beverages, services and public transport), the scale elasticities are negative. The households’ valuation
of these commodities is considered to be higher, because of this the marginal cost of funds increases.
6Going from left to right in table 2, the value for (1 + eE) is 100%, 95.9%, 91.8%, 87.7% and 79.5%.
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As a consequence it becomes more costly for society to increase the tax on these commodities when
demerit arguments play a role. In the four right-most columns (where e = 20pihE), it can be seen that
the commodities with a negative value in the column ‘scale’ rank lowest, the commodities with a positive
value in this column rank highest. This implies that the incorporation of CO2 as demerit externality
stimulates the planner to put a higher tax on commodities for which the normalised willingness to pay
increases when households get richer, and a lower tax on commodities for which the willingness to pay
decreases when individuals get richer.
2.4 Conclusions
If households postpone decisions to decrease their emissions of carbon dioxide, they undervalue the future
consequences of their behaviour and their valuation of a ton of carbond dioxide is too low. From an
economic point of view, this is understood as a situation in which carbon dioxide emissions have demerit
properties: the value the planner attributes to one ton of CO2 differs from the value the households attribute
to it.
In the theoretical section of the paper it is shown how the existence of these externalities with demerit
properties influence the marginal cost of funds of indirect taxes and as a consequence the planner’s indirect
tax decisions. The marginal costs of funds of indirect taxation need to be adapted, first for the externality
problem and second for demerit considerations. The consequences of incorporating the demerit arguments
in the MCF are threefold. There is a direct effect due to the fact that the externality is valued higher.
The second effect is a scale effect. Households are considered to be worse off than they think they are
and because of this are assumed to have a different valuation for the commodities. This is taken into
account in the MCF expressions using the scale elasticities of each commodity. The third correction has
to do with the fact that household utility counts less relatively because the planner takes into account the
consequences of something that was not valued sufficiently before. Especially the scale effects prove to
be important empirically. The direct effect is numerically negligible. The third correction does not create
rank switches because all MCF are multiplied with the same number.
In the empirical sectionMCF of indirect taxes on 13 commodities are calculated for Belgium. If only
the externality is taken into account, no rank switches are realised. Only when demerit considerations are
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taken into account theMCF ranks switch. These rank switches are mostly due to the fact that the planner
evaluates the households at a different (lower) utility level. The results suggest that the planner should put
a higher (lower) tax on commodities for which the households’ willingness to pay increases (decreases)
when income rises. More specifically, as the planner evaluates the households further away from the
utility level they consider themselves to be at, the MCF ranks of electricity, meat & fish, gas and fuels
for heating decrease, and the MCF ranks of clothing & shoes, durables, food & beverage increase. A
revenue-neutral welfare increasing tax reform could consist of an increase of the tax rate on the former,
and an decrease of the tax rate of the latter.
This model is applied to carbon dioxide emissions as demerit externality, emitted because of the
consumption of 13 different commodities. The amount and type of commodity categories is based on
the division made in the household budget survey. With more specific data on categories of commodity
consumption, it would be possible to calculate marginal costs of funds more specifically. Imagine, for
instance, that the government distinguishes between types of car use and is able to put a lower tax rate on
carpooling than on car use by one individual. Then the marginal cost of funds could be calculated for ‘car
use alone’ and ‘car use for carpooling’. This is not possible with the information at hand, since there is no
information on price elasticities and on emissions. This might be a topic for future research.
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APPENDIX A: derivation of the planner’s marginal willingness to pay for private goods and the
externality.
Derivation of WTP expressions
We start from the following identity (see expression (2)):
u˜
(
xl;E
)
= ul
 xl11− eE︸ ︷︷ ︸
x̂l1
, . . . ,
xli
1− eE︸ ︷︷ ︸
x̂li
, . . . ;
E
1− eE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ê
 (A1)
= ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
.
We investigate the impact on social welfare of a change in the tax rate on commodity i. The welfare
function the planner maximizes is
W (t) =
n∑
l=1
λlu˜
(
xl (t) ;E
)
=
n∑
l=1
λlul
(
x̂l (t) ; Ê
)
.
A change in the indirect tax rate on commodity i implies:
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λl
∂ul
(
x̂l (t) ; Ê (t)
)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λl
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂ul
(
x̂l; Ê
)
∂xhj
∂xhj (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λl
 n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
 M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l; Ê
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xhj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l; Ê
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xhj
 ∂xhj
∂qi
 . (A2)
In the second line it can be seen that the tax increase influences all households’ (indexed h) commodity
consumption, which influences in turn (via E) household l’s utility. In the last line we use the assumption
that
∂xhj
∂ti
=
∂xhj
∂qi
. We take a closer look at the part in square brackets in the last line, measuring the impact
on household l of an increase of ti, taking into account the behavioural response of all households. It is
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the building block for the numerator of the MCF expressions. Call this ωli
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
:
ωli
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
 M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l; Ê
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xhj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l; Ê
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xhj
 ∂xhj
∂qi
.
This expression can be split up in two parts: one part that has to do with household l’s behavioural
response and one part that has to do with the other households’ behavioural response:
ωli
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
M∑
j=1
 M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xlj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xlj
 ∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h6=l
 M∑
j=1
 M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xhj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xhj
 ∂xhj
∂qi

=
M∑
j=1
Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
) ∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
) ∂xhj
∂qi
(A3)
with
Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xlj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xlj
(A4)
and
Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xhj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xhj
. (A5)
We want to know how expression (A3) behaves for different values of e, so we linearise it around
ωli
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
to get:
ωli
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
≈
M∑
j=1
Alj
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
) ∂xlj
∂qi
+ e
M∑
j=1
∂Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂e e=0
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
Aljh
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
) ∂xhj
∂qi
+ e
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
∂Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂e e=0
∂xhj
∂qi
. (A6)
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In order to derive the terms
∂Alj(x̂
l(e),Ê(e))
∂e
e=0
and
∂Aljh(x̂
l(e),Ê(e))
∂e
e=0
we need expressions for
Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
and Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
.
Derivation of Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
and Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
.
In expressions (A4) and (A5) it is clear that there is an effect on utility through the consumption
of private commodities and through E. First of all remember that x̂hj = x
h
j (1− eE)−1 and Ê =
E (1− eE)−1. Based on this, we calculate ∂x̂
h
j
∂xli
for all k, l and ∂Ê
∂xli
. Observe that the expression for
∂x̂hi
∂xhi
will look a bit different because xhi influences x̂
h
i both directly and indirectly via the effect on E:
∂x̂li
∂xli
=
1
1− eE +
exlj
(1− eE)2
∂E
∂xli
,
∂x̂lk
∂xhj
=
exlk
(1− eE)2
∂E
∂xhj
,
and
∂Ê
∂xhj
=
[
1
1− eE +
eE
(1− eE)2
]
∂E
∂xhj
=
1
(1− eE)2
∂E
∂xhj
.
Now we fill in these in expression (A4) and (A5) to get
Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
M∑
k=1
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂x̂lk
∂x̂lk
∂xlj
+
∂ul
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂Ê
∂Ê
∂xlj
=
1
1− eE
∂ul
∂x̂lj
+
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂x̂lk
exlk
(1− eE)2
∂E
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂Ê
1
(1− eE)2
∂E
∂xlj
(A7)
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and
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∂x̂lk
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∂ul
∂Ê
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∂E
∂xhj
. (A8)
Observe that, from expression (A7),
Alj
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
=
∂ul
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xlj
, (A9)
and from (A8)
Aljh
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
=
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
(A10)
The linearization
In order to facilitate the derivation, we start by multiplying expressions (A7) and (A8) with (1− eE)2
to get
(1− eE)2Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
= (1− eE) ∂u
l
∂x̂lj
+
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂x̂lk
exlk
∂E
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂Ê
∂E
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, (A11)
and
(1− eE)2Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
=
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂x̂lk
exlk
∂E
∂xhj
+
∂ul
∂Ê
∂E
∂xhj
(A12)
Observe that, for the linearisation, the derivative of the left hand side of expression (A11) with respect
to e is
∂
[
(1− eE)2Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)]
∂e
= 2 (1− eE) (−E)Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
+ (1− eE)2
∂Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)
∂e
,
evaluated at e = 0, we get
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∂
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)
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(
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)
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,
so
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(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
. (A13)
A similar expression can be derived for
∂Aljh(x̂
l(e),Ê(e))
∂e
e=0
.
Now we are ready to calculate the derivatives. The derivative of expression (A11) evaluated at e = 0
is (remember that the marginal utilities depend on the parameter e)
∂
[
(1− eE)2Alj
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
)]
∂e e=0
= −E ∂u
l
∂xlj
+
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+
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k
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. (A14)
The derivative of expression (A12) evaluated at e = 0 is
∂
[
(1− eE)2Aljh
(
x̂l (e) , Ê (e)
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∂e e=0
=
M∑
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(A15)
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This implies for expression (A13), taking into account expression (A9) and (A14):
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.
Now take into account expression (B3) from appendix B,
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.
Rearrange slightly to have
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For
∂Aljh(x̂
l(e),Ê(e))
∂e
e=0
we take into account expressions (A13), (A10) and (A15) to have
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.
Take into account expression (B6) and rearranging slightly to get
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Now we can fill in expressions (A9), (A10), (A16) and (A17) in expression (A6) to have
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.
This is the building block for the marginal cost of funds expressions, fill it in in expression (A2):
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λl
 M∑
j=1
(
∂ul
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xlj
)
∂xlj
∂qi

+
n∑
l=1
λl
e M∑
j=1
((
∂ul
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xlj
)
E +
(
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
E
)
∂E
∂xlj
+ sljE
)
∂xlj
∂qi

+
n∑
l=1
λl
 n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+
n∑
l=1
λl
e n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
(
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
E +
(
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
E
)
∂E
∂xhj
+ slEE
∂E
∂xhj
)
∂xhj
∂qi

(A18)
Rearrange to get
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k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
E
)
∂E
∂xhj
)
∂xhj
∂qi

+eE
n∑
l=1
λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 .
Now note that the term in round brackets in the square bracketed term in the first line equals αlqj with αl
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household l’s marginal utility of income7:
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λl
 M∑
j=1
αlqj
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 (1 + eE)
+ e
n∑
l=1
λl
( M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
E
)
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+ eE
n∑
l=1
λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 . (A19)
Divide and multiply the second term in the first line, the second and the third line with αl to get
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
λlαl
 M∑
j=1
qj
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
∂ul
∂E
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 (1 + eE)
+ e
n∑
l=1
λlαl
 M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
αl
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
αl
E
 n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+ eE
n∑
l=1
λlαl
 M∑
j=1
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 . (A20)
Now take into account expression (3),
qlE =
∂ul
∂E
αl
,
household l’s valuation of a unit of E, split the second part of the term in round brackets in the second
line and take into account expressions (2) and (3) to have
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
αl
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
αl
E =
M∑
k=1
∂ul
∂xlk
αl
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
αl
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk +
∂ul
∂E
αl
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
)
= ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
)
. (A21)
7Household l’s consumption bundle is the solution to the maximization of Lagrangian L = ul
(
xl;E
)−αl (∑Mj=1 xljqj −ml).
The first order condition for commodity j is
∂ul
(
xl;E
)
∂xlj
+
∂ul
(
xl;E
)
∂E
∂E
∂xlj
= αlqj .
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Finally fill in expression (A21) in expression (A20) and set λlαl = Λl:
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
qj
∂xlj
∂qi
+ qlE
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 (1 + eE)
+
n∑
l=1
Λl
e(ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
))
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+ eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 . (A22)
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APPENDIX B: Derivation of the scale effects
The scale effects provide information on how household l’s marginal utility of commodity i changes
when all commodity consumption levels and E change. Start from expression (A9) and assume only
linear effects of commodity consumption on E, so ∂
2E
∂xhi ∂x
h
r
= 0 for all r. Household l’s marginal utility
of commodity j is
Alj
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
=
∂ul
∂xlj
+
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xlj
.
Take the derivative of this expression with respect to xlr, multiply with x
l
r and sum over all r to get
M∑
r=1
∂Alj
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
∂xlr
xlr =
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂xlj∂x
l
r
xlr +
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂E∂xlr
∂E
∂xlj
xlr. (B1)
Take the derivative of the expression with respect to E and multiply with E to have
∂Alj
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
∂E
E =
∂2ul
∂xlj∂E
E +
∂2ul
(∂E)
2
∂E
∂xlj
E. (B2)
Take the sum of expressions (B1) and (B2) and call it slj :
slj =
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂xlj∂x
l
r
xlr +
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂E∂xlr
∂E
∂xlj
xlr +
∂2ul
∂xlj∂E
E +
∂2ul
(∂E)
2
∂E
∂xlj
E (B3)
measuring the impact on household l’s marginal utility of commodity j if all commodities and E increase
with 1 percent.
From expression (A10),
Aljh
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
=
∂ul
∂E
∂E
∂xhj
we derive in the same way
M∑
r=1
∂Aljh
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
∂xlr
xlr =
∂E
∂xhj
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂E∂xlr
xlr (B4)
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and
∂Aljh
(
x̂l (0) , Ê (0)
)
∂E
E =
∂E
∂xhj
∂2ul
(∂E)
2E (B5)
Taking the sum of expressions (B4) and (B5), we have
slE =
∂E
∂xhj
M∑
r=1
∂2ul
∂E∂xlr
xlr +
∂E
∂xhj
∂2ul
(∂E)
2E (B6)
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APPENDIX C: derivation of the MCFi formulae used in the empirical section.
Derivation of the numerator of the MCFi formulae
First turn back to expression (A22) and take into account that
∑M
j=1 qj
∂xlj
∂qi
= −xli.8
∂W (t)
∂ti
=
n∑
l=1
Λl
−xli + n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
qlE
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 (1 + eE)
+e
n∑
l=1
Λl
(ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
))
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi

+eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
+
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
 .
Now multiply with qi to get
∂W (t)
∂ti
qi =
n∑
l=1
Λl
−qixli + n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
qlE
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi
 (1 + eE)
+ e
n∑
l=1
Λl
(ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
))
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi

+ eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
qi +
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
slE
αl
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi
 . (C1)
Now transform derivatives into elasticities; εlji =
∂xlj
∂qi
qi
xlj
. For the first and the second line, take into ac-
count that ∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi =
∂E
∂(qjxhj )
∂(qjxhj )
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi and note that ∂E∂(qjxhj )
∂(qjxhj )
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi =
∂E
∂(qjxhj )
qj
∂xlj
∂qi
qi
xhj
xhj =
εhjix
h
j qj . This implies that
∂E
∂xhj
∂xhj
∂qi
qi = r
h
j ε
h
jix
h
j qj
with rhj =
∂E
∂(qjxhj )
.
For the first term in square brackets in the third line, note that
slj
αl
is the impact of a percentage increase
in all commodities and E on household l’s valuation of commodity j. If it is divided by qj , we have a
8To see this, differentiate the identity
∑M
j=1 x
l
jqj = m
l with respect to qi to have
∑M
j=1
∂xlj
∂qi
qj + x
l
i = 0.
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scale elasticity, so σlj =
slj
αlqj
. It implies that
slj
αl
∂xlj
∂qi
qi
qjx
l
j
qjxlj
= σlj
∂xlj
∂qi
qi
xlj
qjx
l
j
= σljε
l
jiqjx
l
j .
It measures the change in household l’s valuation of commodity j due to the increase in the tax on com-
modity i.
Finally, multiply and divide the second term in the third line by qlE and note that σ
l
E =
slE
αlqlE
is the
scale elasticity of the valuation of E by household l. It measures with what percentage the valuation of E
changes if household l gets a percent more commodities and E.
Use these to fill in in expression (C1):
∂W (t)
∂ti
qi =
n∑
l=1
Λl
−qixli + qlE n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
rhj ε
h
jix
h
j qj
 (1 + eE)
+ e
n∑
l=1
Λl
(ml + qlE
(
E −
M∑
k=1
∂E
∂xlk
xlk
))
n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
rhj ε
h
jix
h
j qj

+ eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
σljε
l
jiqjx
l
j + q
l
E
n∑
h=1
h 6=l
M∑
j=1
σlEr
h
j ε
h
jix
h
j qj
 , (C2)
a simplified version of which will be used in the numerical application:
∂W (t)
∂ti
qi =
n∑
l=1
Λl
−qixli + qlE n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
rjεjix
h
j qj
 (1 + eE)
+ e
n∑
l=1
Λl
(ml + qlEE) n∑
h=1
M∑
j=1
rjεjix
h
j qj

+ eE
n∑
l=1
Λl
 M∑
j=1
σjεjiqjx
l
j + q
l
E
n∑
h=1
h6=l
M∑
j=1
σErjεjix
h
j qj
 , (C3)
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APPENDIX D: From private utility to public utility
Define u˜
(
xh;E
)
as
u˜
 xh
dph
(
xh, uh;E
) ; E
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
 = uh.
If dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
= 1, then u˜
(
xh;E
)
= uh. Now use expressions (6) and (7) to get
uh
 xh
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
− eE
;
E
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
− eE
 = uh,
which implies that
u˜
 xh
dph
(
xh, uh;E
) ; E
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
 = uh
 xh
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
− eE
;
E
dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
− eE
 .
If this expression is evaluated at dph
(
xh, uh;E
)
= 1 (this means that the planner evaluates the household
at the bundle he is actually consuming) we get the required expression.
46 CHAPTER 2
APPENDIX E: Estimation
In order to calculate the price, cross price and scale elasticities needed for the calculation of the
marginal cost of funds expressions, a demand system needs to be estimated. We estimate the linearized
almost ideal demand system (LA-AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) as a seemingly unrelated re-
gression model (SUR). We use data on the consumption of 13 commodities, for the period of 1953-2009,
for Belgium. The budget share data and price data are based on the national accounts. The observations
of 1992-1994 are not included, as the data collection method differed in these years. There are 54 years
of observations and all years before 1992 get a dummy.
The 13 budget shares are
wi = αi +
13∑
j=1
γij log qj + βi log
(m
P
)
+ δid (E1)
with qj the price of commodity j, withm the amount of income, P a price index and d a year dummy. For
simplicity, the price index P is approximated by Stone’s index logP ∗ =
∑13
i wi log qi. With P ∼= ΨP ∗,
we can write
wi = (αi − βi log Ψ) +
13∑
j=1
γij log qj + βi log
( m
P ∗
)
+ δid (E2)
In total there are 13 equations with 16 parameters, so 208 parameters to estimate. Demand theory pre-
scribes a number of restrictions on the parameters of this model:
13∑
i=1
αi = 1
13∑
i=1
γij = 0
13∑
j=1
γij = 0
13∑
i=1
βi = 1
13∑
i=1
δi = 0
γij = γji (E3)
As the sum of all budget shares in expression (E2) equals one by definition, this is a singular system. In
order to be able to estimate the system, one equation is omitted, the coefficients of this equation can be
determined by the restrictions in expression (E3). It has been shown that it does not matter which equation
is omitted (see Wooldridge (2002)). Using the fact that γi13 = −
∑12
j=1 γij , and with α
∗
i = αi−βi log Ψ,
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expression (E2) can be written in estimable form as
wi = α
∗
i +
12∑
j=1
γij log
qj
q13
+ βi log
( m
P ∗
)
+ δid+ ui, (E4)
with ui disturbance. The number of parameters to estimate has decreased, now there are 12 equations
with 15 parameters and in total 66 restrictions, so there are 180− 66 = 114 parameters to estimate. More
specifically, with y a 648 × 1 matrix with budget shares (12 times 54 observations of budget shares), a
648 × 180 block diagonal data matrix X containing 12 blocks of 54 × 15 data matrices x containing
a column of ones, 12 relative prices, real income and the year dummy. In matrix notation, we want to
estimate the coefficients of
y = Xb+ u
w1
w2
...
w12

=

x 0 · · · 0
0 x 0 0
... 0
. . . 0
0 0 0 x


b1
b2
...
b12

+

u1
u2
...
u12

The estimation procedure we use for the system of equations is iterative feasible generalized least
squares, which provides an efficient estimator (Wooldridge (2002)) that converges to the full informa-
tion maximum likelihood estimator (Kmenta and Gilbert (1968)). First a restricted OLS regression is
performed to estimate the 114 parameters, then based on the residuals û a variance covariance matrix is
estimated to perform the GLS estimation in the next step. This procedure is repeated until convergence.
The OLS estimator can be calculated using a 66 × 180 matrix R with restrictions and a 66 × 1 vector r
of zeroes, the restricted 180 × 1 OLS coefficient vector bOLS can be calculated as (see Johnston and Di
Nardo (1997)):
bOLS = (X
′X)−1X ′y + (X ′X)−1R′
[
R (X ′X)−1R′
]−1 (
r −R
(
(X ′X)−1X ′y
))
.
With the error terms of this regression, a 12 × 12 variance covariance matrix is estimated, the kronecker
product of which is Ω, a 648× 648 variance coveriance matrix. This matrix is used as weights in the next
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step of the feasible generalized least squares calculation:
b∗ =
(
X ′Ω−1X
)−1
X ′Ω−1y
+
(
X ′Ω−1X
)−1
R′
[
R
(
X ′Ω−1X
)−1
R′
]−1 (
r −R
((
X ′Ω−1X
)−1
X ′Ω−1y
))
. (E5)
This procedure is repeated until the parameters converge. The estimates of b∗ are such that four of the
compensated own price elasticities are above zero (commodities 1, 3, 8 and 9). Four extra restrictions are
imposed on the system in order to make sure that the compensated own price elasticity are equal to zero.
This implies that the matrix R becomes a 70× 180 matrix and r a 70× 1 matrix with restrictions.
With the parameter estimates for expression (E4) in hand, uncompensated (Marhallian) price elasticity
can be calculated as in Green and Alston (1990)9:
εij = −θij + γij − βiwj
wi
, (E6)
with θij = 1 when i = j and zero otherwise, and the compensated (Hicksian) elasticities can be calculated
as
εcij = εij + wj
(
1 +
βi
wi
)
. (E7)
Income elasticities can be calculated as
εim = 1 +
βi
wi
. (E8)
The scale elasticities can be calculated based on a procedure put forward by Schroyen (2010). They
measure with what percentage the willingness to pay for a commodity changes if the consumer is put on a
different consumption level. The procedure goes as follows. Let w be a column vector with the 13 budget
9In fact, εij = −θij + 1wi
(
γij − βi ∂ logP
∗
∂ log qj
)
, and ∂ logP
∗
∂ log qj
= wj +
∑13
k=1 wk log qk
∂ logwk
∂ log qj
. The last part of the latter
expression is assumed to be zero, hence expression (E6) follows.
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shares in one year. Based on this, a diagonal matrix W is created:
W =

w1 0
. . .
0 w13
 ,
let E be a 13 by 13 matrix of compensated price elasticities, and M a vector with 13 income elasticities.
Now calculate S = WE and b = WM . Now the matrix
 S w
w′ 0
 can be formed, the inverse of
which is
 T 1
1 0
. The vector of scale elasticities can be calculated as σ = − (Tb+ 1), see (Schroyen
(2010)).
50 CHAPTER 2
Appendix F: Data and results
cat. commodity short tax% tiqi CO2/1000e rj σj
10 wj ε
Hicks
ii εim
11
1 Alcohol & Tobacco AT 0.431 0.433 -2.650 0.031 0 0.587
2 Food & Beverage FB 0.058 0.392 -0.736 0.088 -0.289 0.662
3 Meat & Fish MF 0.060 0.923 0.688 0.039 0 0.068
4 Clothing & Shoes CL 0.172 0.100 -4.010 0.047 -0.574 0.205
5 Rent & Water RW 0.046 0.362 0.575 0.215 -0.155 0.849
6 Electricity EL 0.186 1.768 2.501 0.021 -0.900 1.158
7 Gas GA 0.181 1.376 2.699 0.014 -0.463 0.319
8 Other fuels (heating) FU 0.209 1.181 3.286 0.009 0 -0.161
9 Durables DU 0.174 0.315 -1.609 0.050 0 1.462
10 Services SE 0.152 0.127 -1.474 0.353 -0.484 1.334
11 Car Purchase CP 0.169 0.194 1.177 0.055 -0.639 1.696
12 Car Use CU 0.500 4.965 -3.602 0.072 -0.642 0.961
13 Public Transport PT 0.057 0.202 -0.751 0.007 -0.172 0.250
10This is the scale elasticity of each commodity. Calculations are based on the procedure put forward in Schroyen (2010), see
appendix E, σj =
sj
αqj
.
11Income elasticity of each commodity.
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3.1 Introduction
A good job is an important part of life: individual well-being, self-confidence and self-worth benefit
from having a better job (Green (2006)). Like well-being, job quality is an inherently multidimensional
concept. Income is surely one of its dimensions, but other aspects of a job should be taken into account
as well, such as the autonomy or the stress experienced in the job. This makes the measurement of job
quality difficult, as a weighting scheme is needed for its dimensions. In this article we solve this issue
by using the distance function to measure job quality (see Lovell et al. (1994)). Our calculations will be
based on five key dimensions of job quality proposed by Green (2006): income, skill utilization, work
endeavour, personal discretion and risk. We investigate to what extent there is inequality of opportunity
during the first year on the labour market and in the job at the age of 26. We use a questionnaire based
dataset on labour market entry (SONAR) in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium. Besides information
about individual characteristics of the respondents, the dataset contains information on their first job and
their job at the age of 26.
There are several reasons why the quality of jobs matters from a public and welfare economic point
of view. People spend a large part of their lives at work and what they do in their job is linked to who
they are, as many people identify with the jobs they do. Furthermore, a better job increases future job per-
spectives and reduces the burden of working longer (see Clark (2005) or Green (2006)), which is a major
challenge for many economies (Loughlin and Barling (2001)). It allows a person to be an active member
of society and reduces the likelihood of criminal behaviour for young people (Allen and Steffensmeier
(1989), Uggen (1999)). Hence there is considerable societal concern for equality of opportunity in the
labour market (see e.g. Kalter and Kogan (2002, Khattab (2012), ILO (2012), Brynin and Gu¨veli (2012)).
For this reason, labour market agencies have been created in many countries to promote and facilitate high
quality jobs for all citizens. One of their main concerns is equal access to the labour market and many of
their efforts are especially aimed at young workers (ILO, 2012).
This article deals with equality of opportunity for multidimenional job quality of young workers.
This consists of two separate issues: the first one is fairness in achieving job quality, the second issue is
multidimensional job quality measurement. We deal with them one by one.
Ideas about fairness have been articulated in the equality of opportunity literature (see Dworkin
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(1981a,b), Arneson (1989)), where a distinction is made between personal characteristics beyond the in-
dividual’s responsibility, called circumstances, and characteristics the individual is responsible for, called
efforts (Roemer (1998)). From an ethical point of view, inequality due to circumstances is considered
objectionable, whereas inequality arising from differential efforts is morally acceptable. In our setting of
labour market entry, the policymaker observes a specific distribution of job quality based on job charac-
teristics in five dimensions. His aim is a society in which there is equal opportunity for job quality.
The measurement of opportunity inequality requires an answer to several methodological and em-
pirical questions. Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) review the relevant issues and structure the existing
literature based on a coherent framework1. The aim of our contribution is to measure to what extent
observed inequality in job quality achievement is due to inter-individual differences in observed circum-
stances, and compare it with the findings in the literature. We compare the observed job quality inequality
in the dataset with the inequality that would arise in the counterfactual situation in which circumstances
were the same for all individuals, as in Bourguignon et al. (2007). The difference between the two can
only be due to unequal opportunities. This means that we apply an indirect ex-post approach, which is
concerned with outcome differences among individuals with the same circumstances. This choice is not
without flaws –see Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) who argue in favour of a norm-based approach– but
it is made because this is the most often used approach in the literature on income inequality. Inequality
of opportunity in job quality achievement has not been studied before, so it is important to be able to
compare with other findings in the literature.
1On the one hand, Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. An ex-ante approach focuses
on whether individuals have the same opportunity set, regardless of their circumstances, an ex-post approach is concerned with
outcome differences among individuals with the same efforts but different circumstances. On the other hand, they distinguish be-
tween direct and indirect approaches, approaches based on stochastic dominance and norm-based approaches. In a direct approach
the amount of inequality is calculated in the counterfactual situation where all effects efforts are eliminated, whereas an indirect
approach focuses on the extent to which inequality is reduced if all effects of circumstances are eliminated. Both approaches
can be applied in an ex-ante and an ex-post manner. The stochastic dominance approach is based on an ex-ante framework. It
is concerned with comparing the cumulative distribution functions of income of individuals with different circumstances. If there
is no first-order stochastic dominance between these cumulative distribution functions, there is no inequality of opportunity. The
norm-based approach assigns to each individual a norm value for the output variable (e.g. income), as a function of circumstances
and efforts. Then inequality of opportunity is calculated based on the distance between observed income with norm income.
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A specific issue in the analysis of inequality of opportunity is the circumstances-efforts cut: which
variables are to be considered as circumstances, and which variables are deemed efforts2. To some extent,
this is a normative issue. In much of the literature, individuals are held responsible for the aspects of
their life they can influence3. A practical solution is to perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the
circumstances-efforts cut, this is what we will do as well. Sensitivity analysis is performed with respect
to the circumstances-efforts cut in order to check the robustness of our results.
In line with Bourguignon et al. (2007), we take into account the fact that circumstances may have a
direct and an indirect effect on job quality. The direct effects influence job quality directly, controlling for
the impact of effort variables, but ignoring effects through them. They represent achievement differences
that are completely beyond the individual’s control. Indirect effects are effects through effort variables,
for example an individual’s own education level might be influenced by his parents’ education level. This
allows us to pay attention to the different channels through which circumstances influence job quality.
Now we deal with the second issue in this paper: how to measure multidimensional job quality? For the
problem at hand, the planner observes a number of jobs with job characteristics in five dimensions. This
multidimensional nature complicates issues, as multidimensional measurement entails important choices.
The planner needs an evaluation instrument to compare these jobs, so a procedure is needed to summarize
many dimensions into one measure of job quality. Several roads have been followed in the literature. One
way to proceed is to use a fixed weighting scheme for the dimensions (equal weights, frequency based
weights,...), but this is less attractive because it is hard to argue that the same weights should be used for
all types of jobs implying that the trade-off between job characteristics is the same for all jobs. Moreover,
how to determine the set of relative weights? This choice is always somewhat arbitrary, as it is hard for
the planner to fix weights a priori. The advantage of this approach, however, is that it respects an attractive
principle: the dominance principle4 (see Decancq et al. (2011) and Schokkaert et al. (2011)).
2The most common factors beyond the individuals’ responsibility in this literature are ethnicity, parental socioeconomic status and
education level, and gender.
3Other ideas are prevalent as well, such as meritocratism. In a meritocratic view, individuals are held responsible for all personal
factors, even their genetic endowment (Almas et al. (2011)).
4This principle requires that a job with better job characteristics in all dimensions has a higher job quality than a job with worse job
characteristics in all dimensions.
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In order to avoid the choice of arbitrary weights, a weighting scheme could be constructed based on the
preferences of the individuals doing the job. This approach embodies ‘respect for individual preferences’,
which is another attractive normative principle. Fleurbaey et al. (2009) have shown that the two principles,
the dominance principle and respect for individual preferences, are incompatible. Hence, at least one of
the principles has to be sacrificed. We decide to sacrifice the respect for individual preference principle
and keep the dominance principle for the following reason. As the individuals in our sample are new to
the labour market, they have little experience in judging the quality of a job and their preferences might
reflect this lack of experience.5 They have preferences, but these preferences might be ill-informed.
This has two implications. First, respecting individual preferences would imply that two individuals
who are in the same ‘objective’ situation –they have the same circumstances, efforts and have the same
job– might be judged differently in terms of job quality: their job quality differs if their preferences
differ. As these two individuals have the same circumstances and arrive at the same job, we argue that,
from an equality of opportunity point of view, they should be judged the same. Or, to put it in another
way, the planner is interested in the distribution of job quality, irrespective of who has which job. The
second implication is that we allow for some paternalism. To operationalize the framework, we rely on
the so-called output distance function, which satisfies the dominance principle.
The output distance function is a concept commonly used in production economics to analyse firms’
transformation process of inputs into outputs (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) or Coelli et al. (2005)).
Lovell et al. (1994) have proposed to use the distance function for the measurement of well-being and it
has been applied in a number of settings (e.g. Ramos and Silber (2005), Destefanis and Sena (2006)). The
idea behind it is that individuals transform job characteristics in a number of dimensions into job quality.
The achieved bundle of job characteristics is measured relative to a specific maximal attainable bundle
of job characteristics. As such, our job quality measure is similar to a measure of efficiency. Job quality
is expressed as a percentage: a job with the maximal attainable job characteristics has job quality equal
to 1, or 100%. A job with only half of the maximal attainable job characteristics, has job quality of 0.5,
or 50%. The consequence is that a job is considered better when it comes closer to a specific maximum,
5This argument holds in particular for the first job quality as in their job at the age of 26, individuals have gained some experience
in judging job quality.
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independent of the combination of job characteristics. More information about the distance function can
be found in the next section.
The existing empirical literature on inequality of opportunity deals mostly with the achievement of
one-dimensional outcomes such as income, health or educational attainment6. Our article contributes to
this literature in two ways. First, empirical studies that focus specifically on inequality of opportunity in
the job market or job quality achievement are scarce. Second, there is -to our knowledge- no contribution
in this literature that deals explicitly with a multidimensional outcome variable. The aim of this article is to
bridge this gap in the literature. The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. The next section deals
with notation and the distance function. The estimation procedure is provided in section 3.3. Sections 3.4
and 3.5 contain the results and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Notation
School leavers (indexed i = 1, ..., N ) enter the labour market. Each individual i has a vector ofM individ-
ual characteristics zi =
(
zi1, ..., z
i
M
) ∈ RM+ that are beyond his control such as gender, parental education
level, unemployment rate upon labour market entry...7 These are the individual’s ‘circumstances’. He has
K job capacities xi =
(
xi1, ..., x
i
K
) ∈ RK+ suited for the labour market (education level, job market expe-
rience, labour motivation...). The school leavers are (at least partly) responsible for these job capacities.
In the rest of the article, the terms ‘circumstances’ and ‘individual characteristics’ on the one hand, and
‘efforts’ and ‘job capacities’ on the other hand, will be used interchangeably. Finally, in their jobs, they
achieve a vector of L job characteristics bi =
(
bi1, ..., b
i
L
) ∈ RL+ (income, autonomy...). The L×N matrix
b contains the vectors bi of all individuals.
There is a correspondence Bi = B
(
zi, xi
)
: RM+ × RK+ → RL+, mapping individual characteris-
tics and job capacities into achievable job characteristics. The set B
(
zi, xi
)
contains all individual i’s
achievement vectors that can be realized with his input vectors zi and xi. In the process under analysis,
6See Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) for an overview of the literature on income inequality. Opportunity inequality in health is
investigated by Rosa Dias (2009) or Trannoy et al. (2010). Brunello and Checchi (2007), Schu¨tz et al. (2008) and Peragine and
Serlenga (2008) investigate inequality of opportunity in educational attainment.
7Throughout the paper, individuals are indicated using superscripts, subscripts are used for categories of job capacities, job charac-
teristics...
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inputs (job capacities and individual characteristics) are transformed into outputs (job characteristics).
The individual achieves one combination of job characteristics within his output set, bi ∈ B (zi, xi). For
most individuals, bi falls short of their maximal achievable job quality.
In this article, the output distance function is used to measure job quality. The better the job charac-
teristics of a job, the higher the job quality should be, i.e. the dominance principle has to be fulfilled. In
order to make job quality comparable over individuals, each job is compared with the same output set.
This set is called B
(
z0, x0
)
, where it is assumed that each individual is endowed with z0 and x0, the
most favourable situation in terms of individual characteristics and job capacities, respectively. This im-
plies that the reference set B
(
z0, x0
)
bounds all observations from above. The output distance function
Di = D
(
z0, x0, bi
)
is defined upon this output set as
D
(
z0, x0, bi
)
= min
d
(
d :
(
bi/d
) ∈ B (z0, x0)) .
This is a measure between 0 and 1. It is the reciprocal of the factor by which all job characteristics could
be increased while still remaining within the output set, see Figure 1.
Figure 1: The distance function
b1
b2
bi
b / Di i
B(z ,x )0 0
If an individual has a job characteristics vector on the boundary of the set, then the distance is equal
to 1, or 100%. An individual with a vector of job characteristics inside B
(
z0, x0
)
has a lower job quality,
the distance will be below unity. All jobs with the same job quality as job bi are assumed to be on the
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same distance from the output set8. The output distance will be our measure of job quality JQi, for an
individual with job characteristics bi,
JQi = D
(
z0, x0, bi
)
.
Job quality inequality means that JQi differs across individuals. The aim of this article is to investi-
gate to what extent individual characteristics (z-variables) and job capacities (x-variables) play a role in
achieving job quality and, based on this, to determine inequality of opportunity in job quality achievement
3.3 Estimation procedure
Information on the form of the reference output set B
(
z0, x0
)
is generally not available. Often, the only
solution is to rely on empirical information (Ramos and Silber (2005)), and this is also what we do. The
output set we use below is based on the best performing individuals, those with a job characteristics bundle
furthest from the origin in a specific direction. This means that we have to rely on the fact that the data
contain enough and sufficiently diverse observations. The SONAR data we use contain 2512 randomly
selected individuals entering the labour market.
There are several ways to estimate the distance function: it can be estimated both in a parametric
and a nonparametric way. The parametric distance function was originally put forward by Lovell et
al. (1994) and has been applied by Ramos and Silber (2005), who use the output distance function to
measure individual well-being. This approach does not remain without problems, especially the fact that
a specification needs to be chosen is vulnerable to criticism (Anderson et al. (2011))9. Therefore we
use the nonparametric distance function, based on data envelopment (DEA) techniques. The results of
the distance function are compared with the situation where income is taken as the only indicator of job
quality.
8The output distance function is homogenous of degree one in outputs, non-decreasing and convex in outputs and decreasing in x
and z (Coelli et al. (2005)). See Fa¨re and Primont (2001) for a more detailed discussion of the properties of the distance function.
9The results of the parametric distance function estimation in panel data are available from the authors.
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The estimation procedure consists of three steps. First, in section 3.3.1, the nonparametric distance
function is estimated in order to measure each individual’s job quality. In section 3.3.2, job quality in-
equality is measured. Job quality is regressed upon individual characteristics and job capacities. The
amount of opportunity inequality is determined based on the reduction in inequality that would occur if
all individuals had the same individual characteristics.
3.3.1 Nonparametric distance function
In data envelopment analysis, the boundary of the output set is determined based on the best performing
individuals in terms of the dimensions of job quality. Figure 2 illustrates the approach with two individuals
on the output set.
Figure 2: Data envelopment analysis
b1
b2
bi
bj
bk
b / Di i
Three observations of job characteristics, bi, bj and bk, are shown in the figure. The best-off observa-
tions are individuals j and k, so they are on the output set. In the figure Di is the number by which all job
characteristics have to be divided to reach the frontier; obviously Di ≤ 1. With superscripted t referring
to the time period, we can define the job quality measures as:
JQit = Dit.
A linear combination of observations j and k is used to calculate the distance. In order to calculate
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job quality, linear programming techniques are used:
Dit = arg max
λit≥0,Dit≥0
[
0′2N 1
] λit
Dit
 s.t.
 −b bit
1′2N 0

 λit
Dit
 ≤
=
 0
1

A vector λ with individual weights is calculated such that the distance from individual i’s bundle to
the linear combination of the job characteristics vectors of a number of other observations (those on the
output set) is maximal10. The values of λ for individuals that are not on the output set are equal to zero.
3.3.2 Job quality inequality measurement
3.3.2.1 Counterfactual job quality and inequality measurement
To analyse inequality of opportunity, we compare the observed situation with the counterfactual situation
in which all individuals are in the most favourable situation in terms of individual characteristics, z0. To do
this, estimated job quality is related to individual characteristics and job capacities, and then counterfactual
job quality is calculated by putting the individual in the situation with reference individual characteristics.
The most general job quality function can be written as
JQit = f
(
zi, xi, µit
)
,
with µit unobserved determinants. Now, job capacities might depend on individual characteristics: xi =
x
(
zi, ci
)
, with ci unobserved determinants. This implies that the expression becomes:
JQit = f
(
zi, x
(
zi, ci
)
, µit
)
.
In this article, we use an indirect approach to inequality of opportunity measurement (as Bourguignon et al.
(2007)). This means that we compare inequality in the observed sample with inequality in a counterfactual
situation where all circumstances are set to reference levels, zi = z0 ∀i. Counterfactual job quality,
10Obviously, the optimisation is performed in five dimensional space, so generally more than two observations matter for the
determination of the output set. Note that all jobs, from periods 1 and 2, are compared with the same output set.
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taking into account the total effect of individual characteristics, can be calculated by filling in z0 as
J˜Qit = f̂
(
z0, x
(
z0, ci
)
, µit
)
. Counterfactual job quality can also be calculated taking into account only
the direct effects of individual characteristics, not the indirect effects through job capacities. Then we
calculate J˜Qit
d
= f̂
(
z0, xi, µit
)
.
Inequality of opportunity can be analysed by calculating the difference in inequality between the
distribution of JQ and J˜Q. With I an inequality measure defined over both distributions, the inequality
reduction11 after all individual characteristics are equalized, is (see Bourguignon et al. (2007))
ΘI =
I (JQ)− I
(
J˜Q
)
I (JQ)
. (1)
Based on J˜Q
d
, we can calculate I
(
J˜Q
d
)
and
ΘdI =
I (JQ)− I
(
J˜Q
d
)
I (JQ)
. (2)
This enables us to separate direct and indirect effects of individual characteristics. Intuitively, the measure
ΛI =
ΘdI
ΘI
(3)
measures what percentage of total opportunity inequality is due to direct effects of individual characteris-
tics differences.
3.3.2.2 Econometric specification
To construct the counterfactual, we use an econometric approach to get information on the specification
of f
(
zi, xi, µit
)
and f
(
zi, x
(
zi, ci
)
, µit
)
. Job quality is regressed upon job capacities and individual
characteristics with OLS12:
JQi = β0 +
M∑
l=1
βlz
i
l +
K∑
j=1
γjx
i
j + µ
i. (4)
11The reduction of the inequality measure is expressed in relative terms in order to be able to compare our results with the existing
literature.
12For ease of notation, superscript t is omitted.
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The individuals can influence their job capacities, but not their individual characteristics. Individuals put
forward effort to create job capacities, but these job capacities in turn are not independent of the individual
characteristics (the individual’s circumstances). Some individuals are in a more favourable position than
others when they have more favourable individual characteristics, so there is also an indirect effect of
individual characteristics on job quality, through job capacities. In order to separate both effects, each job
capacity is regressed upon individual characteristics. For job capacity j we have
xij = β0j +
M∑
l=1
βljz
i
l + c
i
j , (5)
with cij the residual. The residuals of each of the job capacities regressions are considered as indicators of
effort for each of the job capacities, as it is the part of job capacities that is not determined by individual
characteristics taken into account, so for each individual there is a vector of job capacity efforts ci ∈
RK . The remaining part of expression (5) is determined by the individual’s characteristics. We plug in
expression (5) in expression (4) to have
JQi = β0 +
M∑
l=1
βlz
i
l +
K∑
j=1
γj
(
β0j +
M∑
l=1
βljz
i
l + c
i
j
)
+ µi,
which can be rewritten as
JQi = ϕ0 +
M∑
l=1
ϕlz
i
l +
K∑
j=1
γjc
i
j + µ
i, (6)
where ϕ0 = β0 +
∑K
j=1 γjβ0j and ϕl = βl +
∑K
j=1 γjβlj . With parameter estimates for expressions
(4) and (6), we are able to determine the extent to which individual characteristics and job capacities
contribute to job quality. Individual characteristics (z variables) influence job quality in two ways: there
is a direct effect and an indirect effect through the job capacities (x variables). In the empirical section we
will take a closer look at the difference between these two.
If we are interested in the total effect of individual characteristics on job quality, it suffices to estimate
a reduced form of expression (6). Rewrite the expression as
JQi = ϕ0 +
M∑
l=1
ϕlz
i
l + η
i, (7)
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with ηi =
∑K
j=1 γjc
i
j + µ
i. This is the expression we use to determine the overall influence of the
individual characteristics’ on job quality inequality. Based on expression (7), counterfactual job quality,
taking into account the total effect of circumstances, is calculated:
J˜Qi = ϕ̂0 +
M∑
l=1
ϕ̂lz
0
l + η̂
i (8)
In order to calculate counterfactual job quality, only taking into account the direct effect, expression (4) is
used to calculate J˜Qi
d
:
J˜Qi
d
= β̂0 +
M∑
l=1
β̂lz
0
l +
K∑
j=1
γ̂jx
i
j + µ̂
i. (9)
If these counterfactual job quality estimates are used to calculate the opportunity share of job quality
inequality, we are able to distinguish the differential impact of the direct and the indirect influences of in-
dividual characteristics on job quality inequality. Note that in the calculation of counterfactual job quality,
the residuals of the regressions are used. As such they are considered as efforts, as in Bourguignon et al.
(2007) and Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012). We digress on this below.
3.4 Data
We use a survey database for Flanders (SONAR) that has been specifically created to study the transition
from school to the labour market. This focus implies that it contains a mass of labour market information
for school-leavers in their first work experience. We use the data of the birth cohort 1978, which was
interviewed at the age of 23 and 26. The sample was randomly selected and trained interviewers performed
the oral interviews at the 2512 interviewees’ home address. The first job is defined as the first paid
employment after leaving the educational system, with a job tenure of at least one month and for at least
one hour a day and one day per week. For 1835 of the interviewees, there is information on their job at
the age of 26 as well. After deleting missing observations, in total 3959 observations can be used in the
estimations, 2310 for the first job and 1649 for the job at 26.13 Summary statistics of the data are provided
13There are 686 individuals that are only observed in the first job and not in the job at 26. Only the education level differs significantly
between the two samples, with 7.75 years for the first job and 7.96 years for the job at the age of 26 (see table A1 in appendix A).
There is no significant difference between the other individual characteristics and job capacities in both groups, so the selection
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in appendix A.
The information on job characteristics (b-variables) is in line with Green (2006): income, (lack of)
risk, work endeavour, personal discretion (autonomy) and skill utilisation. Wage is a main determinant
of labour supply and thus a key aspect of job quality. We use the log of net monthly income as the first
job characteristic for all calculations below. The other four characteristics are based on self-assessment.
The respondents were asked to evaluate 19 items on a 4-point scale, ranging from completely agree, rather
agree, rather disagree to completely disagree. Using factor analysis this set is reduced to four variables that
reflect the four non-monetary key factors as defined by Green (2006)14. More information on the 19 items
can be found in appendix B. The second job characteristic is (the lack of) physically demanding work15,
it is an indicator of risk in Green’s terminology. The third job characteristic, work endeavour measures
whether there was time pressure in the job. The fourth job characteristic, skill utilisation, is based on
answers to questions related to the challenge in the job, whether the respondent carried responsibilities,
whether the tasks in the job were not repetitive etc. Finally, personal discretion, is based on questions
related to the autonomy in the job. These job characteristics are observed twice: for the first job and for
the current job.
There are in total 19 other variables providing information about the individuals. There are 13 variables
that are -to a certain extent- under the control of the respondent (x-variables) and 6 variables that are
beyond his control (z-variables). The x-variables can be split up in two categories: on the one hand
characteristics related to the individual’s experience or past: his education level, whether he was a member
of a club, his search strategy... and on the other hand those characteristics that relate to his personality
and his job motivation. In the first category there is educational attainment (number of successful school
years after the age of twelve), the number of search channels or organisations that are used, the duration
of the search period (i.e. the number of months between leaving education and starting in the first job) and
five dummy variables: ‘student work’, ‘apprenticeship’, ‘part-time school’, ‘having children’ and ‘club
bias is limited.
14We did a separate principal component analysis for every key feature identified by Green. Each time the items fitting with the key
feature were included. The weights for the items are determined by factor analysis, see appendix B.
15Combination of responses of the questions: ‘my first job demanded a lot of physical effort’, ‘I had to work in dangerous circum-
stances’, ‘I had to work in a dirty or smelly environment’ and ‘It was a job where I made myself or my clothes dirty’. This number
is multiplied with -1 in order to make it a positive indicator of job quality.
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membership’. The other job capacities belong to the second category: the impression the respondent
makes on the interviewer, the job motivation variables and the ‘locus of control’ variables. The latter are
based on the respondents’ answers to questions related to their idea about who they think is responsible for
their position in life. A factor score for ‘locus of control internal’ indicates whether respondents believe
that they themselves are responsible for their achievements in life. A factor score for ‘locus of control
external’ indicates whether the individuals believe that something or someone else is responsible for their
achievements. There is also information (factor scores) on the degree to which the motivation to work
results from the content of the job or from material aspects related to the job16. This list of efforts is
broader than the lists used in the literature. In Bourguignon et al. (2007), only own education level, a
dummy indicating whether an individual migrated to another region and the individual’s labour market
status are included, Pistolesi (2009) takes into account the individuals’ education level and their labour
supply (annual working hours).
The 6 variables beyond the individual’s control (z-variables) are female, having a low educated mother,
having a highly educated mother, having a non-Belgian grandmother and the regional unemployment rate
at the moment that the respondent leaves school and enters the labour market. The sixth variable is a
factor score containing information about the extent to which the respondent received information about
employment possibilities at school, how to apply for a job, information about the official employment
agency and about temporary employment agencies, information about local companies and vacancies and
about job centres and information about self-employment17. These variables are used both in the first job
and in the job after three years.
This list of circumstances differs from the lists used in the literature (see Ramos and Van de gaer
(2013)). Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) use, apart from parental income and education level, information about
family composition, IQ and body mass index as circumstance variables. Bourguignon et al. (2007) focus
on parental education and occupation, race and region of birth in Brazil. As we are dealing with a small
region (Flanders), the place of birth is less relevant. Regional differences in our analysis are captured by
the regional unemployment rate at labour market entry. An extra circumstance in our model is whether or
16See appendix B for information on the questions used for each of the four variables and the calculation of the factor scores.
17Appendix B contains information on the calculation of the factor score.
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not the individuals received information about the labour market at school.
3.5 Results
This section consists of three parts. First, the distance function estimation is analysed. Second, direct
and indirect effects of individual characteristics (circumstances) are distinguished. Third, inequality due
to individual characteristics is calculated. The results from the distance function are compared with an
analysis based solely on income.
3.5.1 Job quality
The distance is calculated using linear programming in MATLAB. Summary statistics are provided in
table 1. By definition, the maximum value for JQ is 100% because there are a number of individuals on
the frontier, which is common for the two considered periods. Note that there are also individuals on the
frontier in their first job.
Table 1: Summary statistics of income and job quality
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Mean 6.98 7.20 91.84 92.00
St.dev. 0.26 0.26 8.76 9.02
Min 4.82 5.00 55.90 55.40
Max 8.29 9.72 100 100
Note: ln (b1) is the natural log of income, JQ is the measure of job quality.
Table 2 contains correlations and rank correlations between the measures. The correlations are rather
low, the rank correlations are higher but still below 30%. This shows that it makes a difference to look
at job quality in a multidimensional way, apparently the other job characteristics do not correlate strongly
with income.
Table 2: Correlations and rank correlations between the measures
JQ
Correlations 1st job At 26
ln (b1) 0.10 0.09
Rank correlations
ln (b1) 0.24 0.28
Note: All correlations are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
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3.5.2 Determinants of job quality
In this section we take a closer look at direct and indirect effects of individual characteristics on job quality
achievement. The estimations are performed for the first job and the job at the age of 26 separately, in order
to see differences between the two. The results of the estimation of expressions (7) and (4) are shown in
tables 3 and 4 respectively.18 We start with the total effects of circumstances in table 3.
Women achieve a lower income than men, both in their first job and in their job at the age of 26, where
the effect is even stronger. At the same time, they achieve a higher job quality. Women compensate their
lower income by achieving better scores on the other job characteristics. Especially the fact that they have
jobs that are less physically demanding is worth noting19. One reason can be that women are not able
to perform very physically demanding jobs and that men get extra compensation for performing them.
Another reason could be that women might be more critical for jobs than men and that this is reflected in
their search strategy20.
As in Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), parental education plays a more
important role than the other circumstance variables21. Individuals with a highly educated mother perform
better in terms of job quality and those with a low educated mother perform worse. Finally, receiving
information about work at school increases job quality and the unemployment rate at labour market entry
18The unemployment rate at labour market entry has a strong and negative influence on the job capacities. This is partly due to
a cohort effect. Those individuals that started working at 18 entered the labour market at a considerably higher unemployment
rate than those who started working later. As a consequence, the negative effect of the unemployment rate is due to two effects:
a bad labour market situation (for which the individuals are not responsible) and a lower education level (entering the labour
market at the age of 18, for which the individuals are partly responsible themselves). This is problematic because the effect of the
unemployment rate should not depend on the individual’s decisions. To remedy this, we regressed the unemployment rate on the
residuals of the estimation of expression (5), with as dependent variable years of schooling (the residuals of the left-most column
of table C1a). The residuals of this regression are used as indicator of the labour market situation at labour market entry (beyond
the individuals’ control).
19See tables C2a and C2b in appendix C, where each of the job characteristics is regressed on individual characteristics.
20This can be seen in table C1a in appendix C, where the fourth column shows that women tend to use more search channels (job
capacity x4) than men.
21In the literature, gender is often not taken into account. Bourguignon et al. (2007), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Bjo¨rklund et
al. (2012) do not take into account gender. The first and the third study consider only male earnings, the second study deals with
family income or consumption. As such, they avoids problems of comparability between men and women.
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Table 3: Regression results with only circumstances
Expression (7) ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Female -0.038*** -0.073*** 2.917*** 2.771***
Mother with low education -0.047*** -0.044*** -1.117*** -1.326***
Mother with high education 0.081*** 0.065*** 1.622*** 1.761***
Grandmother not belgian -0.005 -0.005 0.178 -0.113
Info about work at school -0.010* -0.004 0.353** 0.193
U-rate at job market entry -0.006** 0.000 -0.187** -0.061
Constant 6.992*** 7.230*** 90.364*** 90.586***
Sample size 2310 1649 2310 1649
Adj R squared 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
decreases job quality, but these two only play a role in the first job, the effects disappear mostly in the job
at the age of 26. This suggests that entering the labour market in a bad situation might be difficult, but the
effects are only temporary.
A part of the total effect of the individual characteristics in table 3 appears through the job capacities,
this part is the indirect effect. Tables C1a and C1b in appendix C contain the job capacity estimations
from expression (5). These results are relevant because they provide information on the channels through
which circumstances determine efforts. They show to what extent the individual’s job quality depends
on circumstances directly and indirectly, via the job capacities. As he does not carry any responsibility
for his circumstances, the individual is not held responsible for the direct effects. He is also not held
responsible for the part of the job capacities that is determined by his circumstances. Indirect effects
might compensate or exacerbate the direct effect.
Especially gender and the parental education level deserve attention. For example, girls study longer,
make a better impression, are more interested in the content of the job and less in the material aspects
of it, etc. All these have an influence on job characteristics and job quality, in turn. We compare the
direct effects of individual characteristics from expression (4) in table 4 below with their total effect, from
expression (7) in table 3.
In almost all cases, the coefficients with the circumstances in table 3 are larger in absolute value than
in table 4, in line with the literature (see Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira et al. (2011) for income or
Rosa Dias (2009) for health). This means that most circumstances influence job capacities in a such a way
that they exarcebate the direct effect. For instance, having a low or highly educated mother negatively
influences job quality in table 3. In table 4 it can be seen that most of the direct effects are not significant,
so the total effect only appears through indirect effects. Apparently, mother’s education level does not
72 CHAPTER 3
influence job quality directly, which is good news from an equality of opportunity point of view22. It only
has an indirect effect through the build-up of job capacities23.
The combined effect of the influences of circumstances on job capacities is that individuals with a
highly educated mother achieve a higher job quality and individuals with a low educated mother achieve
a lower job quality. Only in the case of the income level of women, the picture looks different. Judged by
the direct effect, women have a 6.60% lower income than men, but an only 3.80% lower income judging
by the combination of direct and indirect effects in table 3.
The direct effect of having a non-Belgian grandmother is positive for first job quality, though the effect
disappears when the total effect is taken into account in table 3. Receiving information about the labour
market at school only influences income in the first job. This might be due to the fact that, after they
received information about the labour market, individuals focus less on income when looking for a job.
Finally, we have a look at the coefficients of unemployment rate at labour market entry. In magnitude, the
coefficients in tables 3 and 4 are similar, so indirect effects do not play a considerable role here. Some job
capacities may depend on the unemployment rate at labour market entry, as can be seen in tables C1a and
C1b, but positive effects compensate negative effects so the indirect effects of the unemployment rate on
job quality are negligible.
3.5.3 Inequality of opportunity in job quality achievement
Now we have all the information to calculate counterfactual job quality and to compare observed job
quality inequality in the sample with job quality inequality in the counterfactual situation where individual
characteristics are the same for all individuals. First the analysis is performed with the six circumstances
described above (the z-variables in table A1 in appendix A), then we perform sensitivity analysis by
extending set of circumstances to incorporate the personality related job capacities24, as they might also
be considered to lie beyond the individual’s responsibility.
22A significant direct effect could be seen as evidence that individuals use their parents’ network to find better jobs, as noted by
Peragine and Serlenga (2008).
23This is clearly visible in tables C1a and C1b. For instance, individuals with a highly educated mother study longer, are more
motivated for the content of the job and less motivated for the material aspects of it, they make a better impression, etc.
24These job capacities are the impression the respondent makes during the interview (x2), the job motivation variables x6 and x7,
and the locus of control variables x8 and x9.
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Table 4: Regression results circumstances and efforts
Expression (6) ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Female -0.066*** -0.088*** 1.940*** 1.751***
Mother low edu -0.014 -0.023 -0.399 -0.453
Mother high edu 0.024* 0.023 0.430 0.362
Grandm not belg 0.021 0.025 1.099* 0.523
Info about work -0.014*** -0.003 0.200 0.103
U-rate at LM entry -0.003 -0.002 -0.153** -0.102
Schooling 0.046*** 0.023*** 0.844*** 0.832***
Impression resp 0.005 0.014** 0.524*** 0.562**
Club memb 0.003 0.002 -0.721** 0.036
Nr of search ch -0.004** -0.007*** -0.083 -0.036
Dur search 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.008 -0.033
Job mot - cont -0.009* 0.003 0.893*** 0.933***
Job mot - mat -0.013** -0.011* -0.298 -0.558**
Loc of contr int 0.002 0.007 0.018 0.350
Loc of contr ext -0.002 0.006 0.167 0.091
Having childr 0.003 0.008 -1.114 -0.132
Studwork -0.009 0.021 0.036 -0.132
Apprenticeship -0.020* -0.046*** -0.805** -0.196
Part-time school 0.079*** -0.025 1.687* 0.342
Constant 6.668*** 7.110*** 85.384** 85.012***
Sample size 2310 1649 2310 1649
Adj R squared 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10
Note: Significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level is indicated with *, ** and *** respectively.
We use the procedures set out above to calculate counterfactual job quality. All individuals are put in
a situation where they have ‘reference’ individual characteristics. This means that they are female, have
a highly educated mother, have a Belgian grandmother at mother’s side, received information at school
about work and entered the labour market in the best situation, at the lowest possible unemployment
rate. The residuals are incorporated in the calculation of the counterfactual situation, so we consider the
disturbance as a measure of effort. We use the Theil index as inequality measure25.
Note that the adjusted R squared of the estimations is low26. This means that there is considerable
variation in the data that is not explained by the circumstances and efforts that are taken into account in
the model. This is not uncommon in the literature, e.g. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) arrive at an adjusted R
squared around 6%27. The residuals might capture, apart from noise, the influence of unobserved individ-
ual characteristics and job capacities, and luck. If more individual characteristics had been available in the
data, measured inequality of opportunity increases. For this reason, we consider the estimates below as
lower bounds on inequality of opportunity. With the available data, it is not possible to do better.
In table 5 inequality of opportunity measures are provided, for job quality and income. The first line in
25In the appendix, the calculations are performed with two other inequality measures: mean log deviation and the Gini coefficient.
The results are broadly similar.
26This might be due to the fact that we consider the first job individuals have after leaving school.
27Their data contain only circumstances, no efforts. Their aim is to split up the error term in a circumstance-specific part (het-
eroskedasticity) and in noise.
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Table 5: Inequality measurement
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Theil (observed) 0.0334 0.0437 0.0047 0.0050
Theil counterfactual (only z0) 0.0317 0.0402 0.0042 0.0044
Theil counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.0327 0.0420 0.0042 0.0046
ΘI 4.80% 8.00% 14.89% 12.00%
ΘdI 1.80% 3.89% 10.64% 8.00%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
37.54% 48.62% 71.44% 66.66%
the table contains the Theil index of observed job quality. The second and the third line contain the Theil
index for counterfactual job quality. In the second line, only job characteristics are taken into account to
calculate counterfactual job quality, so it is based on the results of table 3. Counterfactual job quality is
based on expression (8). In the third line, counterfactual job quality is calculated based on the results of
table 4. In this case, only the direct effects of individual characteristics are equalized and counterfactual
job quality is calculated based on expression (9). Finally, ΘI and ΘdI are provided from expressions (1)
and (2), measuring with what percentage inequality would decrease if all individuals were in the reference
situation in terms of individual characteristics. As such they are measures of opportunity inequality. The
former measure takes into account the total effect of the equalization of opportunities, the latter measure
takes into account only the direct effect of equalizing opportunities. The last line in table 5 is the ratio
between ΘdI and ΘI , based on expression (3). It measures what part of opportunity inequality is due to
direct effects.
Now we have a look at the numbers in table 5. Job quality inequality is higher in the job at the
age of 26 than in the first job, the Theil indices for the observed job increase for the three job quality
measures. If only income is taken into account, only 4.80% of opportunity inequality in the first job is
due to circumstance differences, and 8.00% in the job at the age of 26. This is a lower figure than in the
existing empirical literature. In Bourguignon et al. (2007) circumstances account for between 10% and
37% of income inequality in Brazil for a large sample of men aged 26-60, Ferreira et al. (2011) find 26%
to 31% opportunity inequality in Turkey28, Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) reach numbers of roughly one
fourth to a half in their analysis of income inequality in Latin America. Pistolesi (2009) arrives at around
30%-40% opportunity inequality in male earnings in the United States. Though international comparisons
should be interpreted with caution, the difference with the existing literature is probably due to the fact
28The number depends on whether inequality in consumption or inequality in wealth is analysed.
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Table 6: Inequality measurement with extra circumstances
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Theil (observed) 0.0334 0.0437 0.0047 0.0050
Theil counterfactual (only z0) 0.0312 0.0400 0.0036 0.0042
Theil counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.0324 0.0423 0.0041 0.0044
ΘI 7.37% 8.53% 23.40% 16.90%
ΘdI 2.94% 3.11% 12.35% 11.70%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
39.89% 36.46% 52.78% 69.23%
that our sample is rather homogenous. The individuals just entered the labour market and have the same
age, so income differences are lower than if income inequality is measured across ages.
For the job quality JQ, the Theil indix decreases with a higher percentage if inequality due to circum-
stances is eliminated. Inequality of opportunity as judged by the two other job quality measures is similar
in the first and the second job, around 12-15% of inequality is due to differences in individual character-
istics. It clearly makes a difference to look at job quality in a multidimensional manner for judgements of
opportunity inequality. If only income is taken into account, opportunity inequality is underestimated.
Finally we deal with the difference between direct and indirect effects of circumstances. Around 70%
of the opportunity inequality in JQ is due to direct effects. This is in line with the empirical literature, see
i.a. Bourguignon et al. (2007), who find that the direct effect contributes to around 60% of opportunity
inequality in income29. Note that though inequality as a whole goes up at the age of 26, the opportunity
share of job quality inequality remains the same.
Now we perform some sensitivity analysis with respect to the circumstances-efforts cut. We focus on
what would happen if the definition of circumstances is broadened so that it encompasses personality traits
as well. More specifically, the impression the respondent makes (x2), the job motivation variables (x6 and
x7) and the locus of control variables (x8 and x9) could be considered to lie beyond the individuals’
responsibility. Appendix E contains the estimations of expression (7) with the five extra circumstances.
Table 6 tabulates the results of the sensitivity analysis. The measures of inequality of opportunity
increase, while the direct opportunity share in the case of first job quality decreases, as compared to the
results in table 5. The latter observation suggests that the five extra circumstances influence first job
quality mostly via indirect effects -their effects on the remaining job capacities.
29Note here the difference with the results of the Gini coefficient and the MLD in appendix D. The size of the direct effects of
circumstances on opportunity inequality in income are more sensitive for the type of inequality measure chosen.
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3.6 Conclusions
This article deals with job quality measurement and with inequality of opportunity at labour market entry
in the first job individuals find and in their job at the age of 26. One problem with the measurement of job
quality is the fact that there are several job characteristics that have to be weighted in some way. In this
article we follow Ramos and Silber (2005), we use the output distance function to determine the weights
of five job characteristics put forward by Green (2006). The advantage of the approach is that the weights
attached to the job characteristics can differ across jobs and that individuals with the same job are judged
equal in terms of job quality. Job quality based on the distance function is compared with inequality in
the incomes individuals get in their jobs.
Job quality depends on individual characteristics and the individual’s job capacities. The individual
is held responsible for the latter, but not for the former. In the empirical section, we investigate how cir-
cumstances influence job quality. The most important circumstance variables are gender and parental
education. The labour market situation at job market entry only influences the quality of the first job, not
the quality of the job at the age of 26. We separate out direct and indirect effects of individual character-
istics on job quality and observe that the indirect effects play a considerable role.
Concerning the effects of individual characteristics, one important result is that women have a lower
income, but compensate this with a higher score on other job characteristics, e.g. they have a physically
less demanding job. Taken together, women achieve jobs with higher job quality. The direct effect of the
dummy female is positive, and on top of that, women build better job capacities: they study longer, make
a better impression, are more motivated for the content of the job... All these indirect effects improve
on the already positive direct effect. The mother’s educational level plays an important role as well, but
in a slightly different way. Individuals with a low educated mother find jobs with worse job characteris-
tics in all dimensions and those with highly educated mothers find jobs with better characteristics in all
dimensions. Here, there is no direct effect, there are only effects through job capacities. For instance,
individuals with a low educated mother study less, are less motivated for the content of the job, make a
worse impression... All these influence job quality indirectly.
The results regarding inequality of opportunity are that job quality inequality increases over time for
all job quality measures, but the magnitude of inequality of opportunity remains the same. Inequality of
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opportunity is measured as the percentage the inequality index decreases if the individuals are put in a
counterfactual situation in which circumstances are equal for all. Income inequality decreases with about
5% if all circumstances are equalized and this percentage is slightly higher in the job at the age of 26.
Between 12% and 14% of the observed job quality inequality is due to differential circumstances. A bit
less than half of this percentage is due to the direct impact of circumstance differences, the remainder is
due to indirect effects via job capacities.
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Appendix A: Data and job quality measures
Table A1: Individual characteristics and job capacities
First job Job at the age of 26
Variable name Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max.
b1 wage 1107.36 123.95 4000.00 1383.48 148.00 16600.00
b2 risk (physically demanding work) 5.00 2.35 6.15 5.00 2.56 6.21
b3 work endeavour 4.73 2.95 6.21 5.00 2.95 6.21
b4 skill utilisation 5.00 2.49 6.71 5.00 0.79 6.56
b5 personal discretion (autonomy) 5.00 3.59 7.02 5.00 2.97 6.67
z1 gender (dummy female=1) 0.50 0 1 0.49 0 1
z2 mother low education (dummy) 0.34 0 1 0.33 0 1
z3 mother high education (dummy) 0.25 0 1 0.26 0 1
z4 grandmother not Belgian (dummy) 0.08 0 1 0.07 0 1
z5 info about work during education 0.00 -1.66 1.54 0.00 -1.66 1.54
z6 u-rate at job market entry 8.67 3.54 17.58 8.55 3.54 17.58
x1 schooling (years) 7.75 1 14 7.96 1 14
x2 impression respondent 0.03 -4.83 6.08 0.08 -4.51 6.08
x3 club membership (dummy) 0.56 0 1 0.53 0 1
x4 number of search channels 3.80 0 14 3.78 0 14
x5 duration of search period 5.27 1 103 5.27 0 103
x6 job motivation - content 0.00 -3.78 2.31 0.00 -4.36 2.64
x7 job motivation - material 0.00 -3.77 2.94 0.00 -3.01 4.07
x8 locus of control internal 0.00 -3.21 2.40 0.00 -2.99 2.52
x9 locus of control external 0.00 -3.04 2.45 0.00 -3.53 2.82
x10 having children (dummy) 0.03 0 1 0.19 0 1
x11 student work (dummy) 0.79 0 1 0.80 0 1
x12 apprenticeship (dummy) 0.67 0 1 0.67 0 1
x13 part-time school (dummy) 0.08 0 1 0.07 0 1
82 CHAPTER 3
Appendix B: Factor analysis
This appendix contains information on the construction of the job characteristics, the locus of control
variables and the job motivation variables. Respondents were asked to answer 19 questions on a four point
scale (completely disagree, rather disagree, rather agree, completely agree). Job characteristics 2, 4 and 5
are based on the answers to these questions using factor analysis. The third job characteristic is based on
the answer to one question: I had to work at a high pace or under time pressure.
Table B1: Risk (physically demanding work)
Items for b2 Component
My first job demanded a lot of physical effort 0.718
I had to work in dangerous circumstances 0.733
I had to work in a dirty or smelly environment 0.769
It was a job where I made myself or my clothes dirty 0.835
Table B2: Skill utilisation
Items for b4 Component
My job demanded a lot of mental effort 0.609
My job demanded creative ideas 0.745
I carried a lot of responsibilities 0.666
It was a job I saw the results of 0.611
It was a job where I could show what I was capable of 0.797
It was a job where I had to cooperate with others 0.330
It was a job where I always had to do the same things -0.641
It was a job where I could endulge myself 0.755
I regularly had to study for my job 0.845
My job was challenging 0.835
I did things in my job that were worth doing 0.650
Table B3: Personal discretion (autonomy)
Items for b5 Component
I could decide in which way I did my work 0.817
I could decide how much work I did in one day 0.875
I could decide which work I did in one day 0.872
The individual characteristic ‘information about work during education’ is based on the answers to 6
questions, on a four point scale (completely disagree, rather disagree, rather agree, completely agree).
The job motivation variables are based on seven questions, on a four point scale (completely disagree,
rather disagree, rather agree, completely agree). They are summarised in tables B5 and B6.
Finally, there are two locus of control variables: locus of control internal and locus of control external.
They are based on four variables on a four point scale (completely disagree, rather disagree, rather agree,
completely agree).
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Table B4: Info about work during education
Items for z5: Component
At school I got information about...
writing letters and cv 0.606
the VDAB (public employment service) 0.653
companies, employment agencies,... 0.755
job advertisements 0.757
job fairs 0.513
being self-employed 0.545
Table B5: Job motivation - content
Items for x6 Component
Working gives you the feeling to do something useful 0.662
One works mainly in order to do interesting things 0.818
One works mainly in order to do creative things and have new ideas 0.790
Table B6: Job motivation - material
Items for x7 Component
One works mainly to make money 0.712
It is better to accept any job than to be unemployed 0.583
The type of work is not important, as long as one makes money 0.685
One works mainly to have security and stability in life 0.625
Table B7: Locus of control internal
Items for x8 Component
If you don’t make progress in life, it is your own responsibility 0.792
Succes in your job is a matter of hard work, luck only has minor influence 0.792
Table B8: Locus of control external
Items for x9 Component
Most of the bad things happen without that you have an influence on them 0.767
Whether or not you get a good job depends on accidentally being at the
right place at the right moment 0.767
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Appendix C: Regression results individual characteristics and job quality
Table C1a
Expression (5) x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
z1 gender (dummy female=1) 0.848*** 0.167*** -0.170*** 0.401*** 0.480 0.237*** -0.187***
z2 mother low education (dummy) -0.710*** -0.206*** -0.069*** -0.033 1.338*** -0.011 0.244***
z3 mother high education (dummy) 1.480*** 0.047 0.155*** 0.338** -1.356*** 0.145*** -0.265***
z4 grandmother not belgian (dummy) -1.090*** -0.003 -0.074** -0.132 5.361*** -0.190** -0.036
z5 info about work during education 0.037* 0.107* -0.339** 0.088*** 0.022
z6 u-rate at job market entry 0.004 -0.062*** -0.807*** 0.006 0.031***
Constant 7.295*** 0.009 0.631*** 3.541*** 4.482*** -0.135*** 0.080**
Sample size 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 2510 2428
Adj R2 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.06
Table C1b
Expression (5) x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13
z1 gender (dummy female=1) -0.220*** -0.007 0.003 0.058*** 0.215*** -0.054***
z2 mother low education (dummy) 0.078* 0.107** -0.005 -0.082*** -0.003 0.023*
z3 mother high education (dummy) -0.027 -0.148*** -0.010 0.087*** -0.024 -0.054***
z4 grandmother not belgian (dummy) 0.110 -0.087 0.005 -0.152*** -0.157*** 0.076***
z5 info about work during education 0.042** 0.025
z6 u-rate at job market entry 0.005 0.009
Constant 0.080** 0.011 0.028*** 0.781*** 0.585*** 0.102***
Sample size 2497 2497 2510 2510 2510 2510
Adj R2 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03
Note: Significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level are indicated with *, ** and *** respectively.
The unemployment rate at labour market entry is only taken into account when it is relevant.
For each of the job characteristics, the specification is
bim = α0m +
M∑
l=1
αlmz
i
l + η
i
m, (C1)
estimated with OLS. The results of these regressions are provided in tables C2a and C2b.
Table C2a: Job characteristics estimations – first job
Expression (C1) for first job ln (b1) b2 b3 b4 b5
Female -0.038*** 0.412*** -0.012 0.044 0.041
Mother with low education -0.047*** -0.133*** -0.047 -0.133*** -0.172***
Mother with high education 0.081*** 0.222*** -0.001 0.185*** 0.222***
Grandmother not belgian -0.005 -0.121* 0.039 -0.134* -0.085
Info about work at school -0.010* 0.053*** -0.023 0.072*** 0.059***
U-rate at job market entry -0.006*** -0.042*** 0.012 -0.022** -0.030***
Constant 6.992*** 4.780*** 4.753*** 4.989*** 4.992***
Sample size 2310 2310 2310 2310 2310
Adj R squared 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04
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Table C2b: Job characteristics estimations – job at the age of 26.
Expression (C1) for job at the age of 26 ln (b1) b2 b3 b4 b5
Female -0.073*** 0.484*** -0.004 -0.020 0.082*
Mother with low education -0.044*** -0.277*** -0.076 -0.160*** -0.138**
Mother with high education 0.065*** 0.211*** 0.111* 0.199*** 0.270***
Grandmother not belgian -0.005 -0.140 0.003 -0.092 -0.087
Info about work at school -0.004 0.018 0.023 0.044* 0.009
U-rate at job market entry 0.000 -0.031*** 0.014 0.001 -0.028***
Constant 7.230*** 4.808*** 4.995*** 5.016*** 4.941***
Sample size 1649 1649 1649 1649 1649
Adj R squared 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04
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Appendix D: Inequality measurement using Gini coefficient and Mean Log Deviation
This appendix contains inequality calculations based on two other inequality measures put forward in
the literature: the Gini coefficient and Mean Log Deviation (MLD).
Table D1: Inequality measures with Gini coefficient
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Gini (observed) 0.1324 0.1289 0.0562 0.0584
Gini counterfactual (only z0) 0.1288 0.1251 0.0503 0.0491
Gini counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.1315 0.1254 0.0525 0.0534
ΘI 2.75% 2.91% 10.57% 15.87%
ΘdI 0.74% 2.66% 6.65% 8.62%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
26.90% 91.41% 61.59% 54.31%
Table D2: Inequality measurement based on Mean Log Deviation
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
MLD (observed) 0.0334 0.0362 0.0048 0.0052
MLD counterfactual (only z0) 0.0317 0.0341 0.0043 0.0046
MLD counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.0327 0.0349 0.0045 0.0048
ΘI 5.06% 6.05% 10.66% 11.90%
ΘdI 2.02% 3.65% 6.79% 8.35%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
39.93% 60.34% 63.70% 69.65%
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Appendix E: Inequality measurement with personality traits as circumstances
Table E1: Job quality regression results with only individual characteristics in reduced form.
Expression (7) ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Female -0.048*** -0.084*** 2.271*** 2.314***
Mother with low education -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.712* -1.150**
Mother with high education 0.073*** 0.054*** 1.270*** 1.293**
Grandmother not belgian -0.005 0.010 0.546 0.044
Info about work at school -0.009* -0.003 0.230 0.300
U-rate at job market entry -0.005** 0.000 -0.160** -0.058
Impression respondent 0.014** 0.021*** 0.672*** 0.726***
Job motivation - content 0.005 0.007 1.137*** 1.044***
Job motivation - material -0.038*** -0.024*** -0.738*** -0.982***
Locus of control external -0.003 0.003 -0.107 0.178
Locus of control internal -0.005 0.002 0.101 -0.056
Constant 6.995*** 7.235*** 90.620*** 90.885***
Sample size 2310 1649 2310 1649
Adj R squared 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08
Table E2: Inequality measurement with three extra circumstances
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
Gini (observed) 0.1324 0.1289 0.0562 0.0584
Gini counterfactual (only z0) 0.1269 0.1248 0.0483 0.0504
Gini counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.1308 0.1246 0.0496 0.0512
ΘI 4.49% 3.18% 14.06% 13.70%
ΘdI 1.21% 3.34% 11.74% 12.33%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
26.95% 105.03% 83.50% 90.00%
Table E3: Inequality measurement with three extra circumstances
ln (b1) JQ
1st job At 26 1st job At 26
MLD (observed) 0.0334 0.0362 0.0048 0.0052
MLD counterfactual (only z0) 0.0311 0.0338 0.0039 0.0043
MLD counterfactual (z0 and x) 0.0324 0.0335 0.0042 0.0046
ΘI 6.82% 6.76% 19.08% 17.91%
ΘdI 3.00% 7.46% 12.79% 12.35%
ΛI=
ΘdI
ΘI
43.95% 110.42% 38.39% 69.23%

Chapter 4
Measuring individual well-being and
poverty using equivalent income and
self-reported possibilities
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4.1 Introduction
Evaluating well-being and comparing it across individuals is a difficult exercise. How to compare, for
instance, a poor individual in good health with an individual in a worse health situation, but with a high
income level? It has been argued that the individuals’ own judgment about their life should be taken into
account in some way, i.e. their preferences between health and income should be respected (Fleurbaey et
al. (2009), Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013)). People are assumed to have ‘true underlying preferences’,
but these are hard to measure (McQuillin and Sugden (2012)). For measuring well-being, information on
preferences is usually derived from self-reported satisfaction with life or happiness1. But satisfaction is
arguably not the only thing that matters, and problems have been reported with its measurement (Fleurbaey
and Blanchet (2013)).
McQuillin and Sugden (2012) argue that it could be interesting to identify another object of value,
assign normative value to it, and try to measure it to obtain information on preferences. The aim of this
paper is exactly this. We investigate whether information on preferences can be derived from the concept
‘self reported possibilities’2 and whether it can overcome some of the problems associated with satisfac-
tion measurement. We calculate equivalent income, as proposed by Fleurbaey et al. (2009), based on
satisfaction and on possibilities, and compare it with four other measures: family income, family income
corrected for family size, self-reported satisfaction and self-reported possibilities. We use a questionnaire
conducted in Flanders (Belgium) containing extensive information on individuals’ lives. We investigate
who is considered poor in each of the measures.
The next section discusses the measurement of true underlying preferences. The concept of self-
reported possibilities is introduced and discussed. Section 4.3 and 4.4 deal with notation and the data.
Section 4.5 contains the results and section 4.6 concludes.
0I would like to thank Luc Van Ootegem and Elsy Verhofstadt for providing me with the data and Dirk Van de gaer and Erik
Schokkaert for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1Both the terms happiness and satisfaction are used in the literature. In this paper, we stick with the term (life) satisfaction, as this
is the term used in our questionnaire.
2Self-reported possibilities are the possibilities people have today to pursue whatever they strive for.
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4.2 Preferences and well-being
It is well-established in the literature that well-being is a firmly multidimensional concept (see e.g. Stiglitz
et al. (2009), Helliwell (2012)). A life is then described in terms of the achievement of functionings3 in
a number of dimensions, such as health or material living standards. To arrive at an overall measure of
well-being, a synthetic index needs to be calculated with trade-offs between the different dimensions.
There are several ways to translate many dimensions into one. One way is to determine a priori weights
for the dimensions (see Decancq and Lugo (2013) for an overview), another way is to rely on the distance
function (see Ramos and Silber (2005) or Defloor (2013)). In these approaches, however, the weights
are not based on the judgments of the individuals themselves, which renders these approaches paternalist.
Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) argue that there is a general consensus in the literature that, in some form,
people’s own judgments should be the ultimate guideline in the evaluation of their well-being. Fleurbaey
et al. (2009) proposed a theoretically attractive approach to do this: the equivalent income approach,
which we use in this paper. Equivalent income is the level of income that, given reference values for the
other dimensions of functionings, makes an individual indifferent to his actual situation.
In order to calculate equivalent income, information on individual preferences is needed, which is not
easy to obtain. In the literature, this information is usually distilled from an overaraching evaluation ques-
tion where individuals are asked to evaluate their well-being in some way, and econometric techniques are
used to derive information on preferences. In the satisfaction literature, well-being is usually measured by
individual life satisfaction. The life satisfaction question in our questionnaire is standard and formulated
as “How satisfied are you with your life as a whole, on a scale from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10
(excellent)”.
Two problems are associated with this cardinalisation of preferences. The first problem is related to
the physical condition neglect of satisfaction information (Sen (1980 and 1985)): the mental state of the
individual does not say anything per se about his physical condition. People may adapt their aspirations
to their life situation and state to be relatively satisfied when they are income poor or in bad health.4 The
3The term functionings is due to Sen. A funtioning is conceptualized as his doings or beings in a specific dimension of life.
4As argued in Fleurbaey et al. (2009), pleasure is not always good, and displeasure is not always perceived as something bad. Some
sources of pleasure are disliked, whereas there are types of dissatisfacion that relate to the value of important aims in life still to be
WELL-BEING MEASUREMENT 93
second problem has to do with the fact that the answers people provide to the self-reported satisfaction
question are a mixture of two things: a cognitive judgment –what people think of their life– and an
affective judgment –how people feel in their life (Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013)). Information on true
preferences should be based on the former, not on the latter, as affective information might be influenced
by moods –which are typically short-lived.
Consequently, in order to get information on true underlying preferences –the cognitive judgment
individuals make about their lives, aspirations and affective judgments need to be filtered from the life
satisfaction information. Equivalent income does this. Empirically, a number of variables are associated
with aspirations and affects, and their direct effects on life satisfaction are left out of consideration in
the calculation of equivalent income. To the extent that aspirations and affects are captured by the direct
effects of these variables, equivalent income respects individuals’ cognitive evaluation of their lives. This
is an empirical matter.
If an overarching evaluation question can be found that is less dependent on aspirations and affects,
then it might provide clearer information on the individuals’ true underlying preferences, as no correction
is needed. Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) argue that there are other things that people value, apart from
life satisfaction. They note that, even if satisfaction were the only aspect of life that is relevant, and all
other aspects had some impact on satisfaction, this would not prove that the other aspects of life are also
not partly desirable for themselves5.
The concept we focus on in this paper is based on how individuals perceive the possibilities they have
today to whatever they want. An individual’s functionings achievement contributes to his possibilities, e.g.
someone with a better health or a higher income might have more possibilities, he is more able to pursue
the things he wants. Someone with a low income might be inhibited to pursue the things he wants. This is
how we interpret the second overarching question we take into account to get information on preferences.
The self-reported possibilities question in our questionnaire goes as follows: “How are the possibilities
for you, in general, on a scale from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10 (excellent)”. This question refers to
accomplished.
5They give the example of health: the fact that health is directly desired does not imply that people only want a good health for the
purpose of being happy or satisfied. They also note that the effect on satisfaction of some of the things people strive for is unsure,
e.g. people aim for having a diploma, but the effect of being higher educated on satisfaction is unsure and might well be negative.
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the possibilities today, it is the last question of a list of ten aspects of possibilities from the survey we use
from Van Ootegem and Verhofstadt (2013)6 (see appendix A). This is also a cardinalisation of preferences
and an alternative source of information on preferences. There are reasons to assume that self-reported
possibilities are less biased by aspirations and affects. Especially the framing of the question matters.
Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) devote specific attention to the framing of the overarching question.
They identify three problems with which the respondent is confronted when answering questions of the
types stated above: (1) the scope problem –which part exactly of life is relevant, (2) the ranking problem
–how does the life stand in the set of relevant possible lives– and (3) the calibration problem –how does
the position in the ranking translate into a number between 0 and 10. In order to resolve the first two
problems, they suggest to pay specific attention to the order of the questions and the framing in the
questionnaire. Ambiguity of scope is likely to create uncontrolled diversity across individuals, and thus
more noise in the answers. The ranking problem has to do with the cognitive complexity of putting the
multidimensional nature of life into an ordinal scale. When confronted with this difficulty, respondents
might be induced to avoid the question and consider whether their mood of the day or other salient aspects
of life provide informative information, and forget relevant aspects of life. If the evaluative question is
asked after a comprehensive list of dimensions of life, the scope problem and the ranking problem are
somewhat reduced, as the relevant dimensions of life are brought in mind of the respondent7. The third
problem –the calibration problem– is harder to resolve. The respondent must choose a benchmark with
which to compare their life. There are several options, such as the individual’s own life experience, the
lives of other people etc. This introduces a source of heterogeneity across individuals. We do not pay
specific attention to this issue here, we assume that the heterogeneity is taken up by the residuals in the
estimations below.
We argue that our self-reported possibilities question might provide better information on the cognitive
judgment of an individual’s life for two reasons. First, we argue that self-reported possibilities are less
vulnerable to the influence of affects than self-reported satisfaction. The reason for this is that satisfaction
6Individuals are asked to rate their possibilities today, to find happiness, to live a healthy life, to have access to education, to decide
the direction of life, to have enough income, etc...
7Comparability across individuals is enhanced too. They all have answered the same questions and so when they answer the
overarching question, their scope is more similar.
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or happiness are important aims in life for many people and they are often the subject of societal debate.
Consequently, individuals might feel the need or the duty to state to be relatively satisfied, even if their
living conditions are miserable. Moreover, happiness and satisfaction refer more to feelings than the
extent to which people have possibilities to pursue whatever they want. As a consequence, the answers
to the satisfaction question might be more guided by a judgment about their affects than by a cognitive
judgment about their lives. The extent to which individuals have possibilities is much less debated, so
individuals might have to think more deeply about the possibilities question. Their mood of the day or
other salient aspects of life are less informative for answering this question. Consequently, their answers
might reflect closer their cognitive evaluation of their lives.
The second reason has to do with the framing of the possibilities question in our survey. Before
answering the possibilities-in-general question, individuals are asked to answer ten questions about their
possibilities in a number of dimensions of life –see appendix A. As a consequence, the scope of the
question is clear and it is the same for all respondents. For this reason, we argue that the answers to the
possibilities question provide a more focused picture than the satisfaction question, which in our survey
is asked without reference to a specific frame. This implies that we expect that answers to the possibilities
questions contain less noise than the answers to the satisfaction with life question.
In the empirical section, we investigate how the achievement of functionings in a number of dimen-
sions of life contributes to satisfaction and to possibilities. From this, information on preferences is de-
rived. To do this, we use the list of eight dimensions of functionings provided in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
report8 (Stiglitz et al. (2009)). We use the LEVO dataset, where a sample of the flemish population is
surveyed (see Van Ootegem and Verhofstadt (2013)).
4.3 Notation and criteria
There are N individuals, indexed i = 1, ..., N . Each individual i achieves a vector of M functionings
f i =
(
f i1, ..., f
i
M
) ∈ RM+ , his individual beings and doings in M life domains. The individual’s family
income is yif ∈ R+ and adjusted income yia ∈ R+ is family income divided by the square root of the
8These dimensions are (i) material living standards, (ii) health, (iii) education, (iv) personal activities including work, (v) political
voice and governance, (vi) social connections and relationships, (vii) environment and (viii) physical and economic security.
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family size. Individual i has K individual characteristics, represented by the vector xi =
(
xi1, ..., x
i
K
) ∈
RK+ . These are demographic variables such as gender, age, having children, the number and the age of the
children,... Each individual has L personality traits, the vector ti =
(
ti1, ..., t
i
L
) ∈ RL. The individual’s
reported level of satisfaction is si ∈ R+ and his self-reported possibilities are represented by pi ∈ R+.
Individual i’s mood of the day is mi ∈ R+.
Let Ri be a binary relation on (f, y), interpreted as individual i’s preference ordering. The statement(
f i, yi
)
Ri
(
f i′, yi′
)
means that
(
f i, yi
)
is considered at least as good as
(
f i′, yi′
)
from the point of view
of individual i. Let Ai denote the individual’s aspirations, relating to the individual’s frame of reference,
with which individual i judges his satisfaction or possibilities.
Individual i’s answers to the satisfaction si and possibilities questions pi depend on his achievement
of functionings and income, his preferences, his aspirations, his mood of the day and disturbance εis and
εip:
si = s
((
f i, yi
)
, Ri, Ai,
(
mi, εis
))
.
pi = p
((
f i, yi
)
, Ri, Ai,
(
mi, εip
))
.
The marginal rates of substitution between functionings and income9 can differ across individuals. For
instance older people might prefer health more than younger people. In this model, apart from the influ-
ence of mi and disturbance, an individual can be more satisfied/have more possibilities in three ways: via
higher functionings and income achievement, by adapting his preferences and by reducing his aspirations.
Two individuals with the same preferences and functionings achievement, may have a different level of
satisfaction or possibilities due to differences in aspirations.
In order to compare the measures we deal with below, a number of criteria an ethically sound well-
being measure could fulfill are set out. They are listed in table 1 and are written out formally in appendix
B. The first criterion is an obvious criterion. A sound well-being measure should be independent of
temporary influences, such as the mood of the day. The second criterion has to do with the individuals’
9In the satisfaction model, individual i’s marginal rate of subsitution between functioning k and income is dy
i
dfi
k
= −
∂si
∂fi
k
∂si
∂yi
.
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aspirations. A comparison of the well-being of two individuals should be independent of their aspirations,
as these only reflect the influence of the individuals’ frame of reference with which they judge about their
satisfaction or possibilities.
The third and the fourth criterion deal with dominance. A measure fulfilling the dominance crite-
rion is increasing in all functionings and income. If two individuals are compared, the one with higher
functionings or income achievement is considered better-off. We distinguish between unconditional and
conditional dominance. Unconditional dominance means that the well-being measure increases in func-
tionings and income also when preferences differ across individuals. Conditional dominance means that
the well-being measure increases in functionings and income, but on the condition that preferences are
the same across individuals. If a measure fulfills the unconditional dominance criterion, it also fulfills the
conditional dominance criterion.
Criteria 5 and 6 deal with respect for preferences. A distinction is made between conditional and
unconditional respect. A well-being measure fulfilling unconditional respect for preferences takes into
account inter-individual differences in preferences also when individuals’ aspirations differ. Conditional
respect means that preferences are respected conditional on the fact that aspirations are the same across
the compared individuals. If a measure fulfills the unconditional respect for preferences criterion, it also
fulfills the conditional respect for preferences criterion.
As argued in Fleurbaey et al. (2009), there is a conflict between the unconditional respect for prefer-
ences criterion and the unconditional dominance criterion. If preferences are to be respected, uncondi-
tional dominance has to be given up, i.e. a well-being measure can not fulfill both criteria. Below, we opt
to keep keep criterion 5 and so we will have to stick with the conditional dominance criterion. In fact,
none of the measures used below satisfies the dominance criterion. In section 4.5.2 each of the proposed
well-being measures is evaluated in terms of the criteria listed in table 1.
Table 1: Criteria for well-being measures
Criterion
1 Independence of the mood of the day
2 Independence of aspirations
3 Unconditional dominance
4 Conditional dominance
5 Unconditional respect for preferences
6 Conditional respect for preferences
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4.4 The data
The 2011 LEVO questionnaire is used, taken in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium. The sample
contains 1158 usable observations10, table 2 contains summary statistics. Apart from demographic and
socio-economic information, respondents were asked questions related to their functionings and their pos-
sibilities in 10 dimensions (see appendix A) and about their satisfaction with life –‘how satisfied are you
with your life as a whole, on a scale from 0 to 10?’. The answer to the last possibilities question –‘how
are the possibilities for you, in general, on a scale from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10 (excellent)?’– is
used as a measure of self-reported possibilities. Apart from family income, five dimensions of function-
ings11 are distinguished from the available data: being in good health (f1 health), being well-educated (f2
education), having a good social life (f3 social) and living in a pleasant environment (f4 environment).
The fifth functioning has to do with the individual’s employment situation and consists of five dummies:
f5 retired, f6 unemployed, f7 unable to work, f8 housewife and f9 working. This list is in line with the
list of dimensions put forward in Stiglitz et al. (2009).12
One remark is in place concerning the interpretation of education as a functioning. In Fleurbaey et
al. (2009) and Schokkaert et al. (2011), the number of years of schooling is not a functioning, but an
individual characteristic influencing preferences. In the questionnaire used for this paper, respondents are
asked, on a scale from zero to ten, how well-educated they consider themselves. This comes much closer
to the interpretation of a functioning in the sense of Stiglitz et al. (2009), as it measures what people
manage to be or to do with their education level. It also figures in Nussbaum’s list of ten dimensions of a
good life. An individual who left school at an early age can consider himself well-educated if he considers
his education level sufficient for the job he is doing.
10In total there are 1709 respondents. Students are not taken into account because of problems with the reported family income
level. When missing observations are excluded, 1158 observations remain. In the empirical section below, the data are weighted
to obtain a sample representative for the Flemish population according to life situation, gender and age distribution.
11These are the answers to the third, fourth, sixth and seventh functioning question in appendix A and the individual’s employment
situation.
12The list in Stiglitz et al. (2009) contains eight dimensions. The list of dimensions used in this paper covers six of these eight
dimensions. Political voice and governance and physical and economic security are not covered, but they can be assumed equal
for all respondents, as they all live in the same region. The dimension ‘personal activities including work’ is assumed to be covered
by the five dummies relating to the individual’s employment situation.
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Table 2: Data description
Mean St.Dev Low High
s Self-reported satisfaction 7.36 1.38 0 10
p Self-reported possibilities 7.65 1.05 0 10
yf Family income 3079.02 1391.62 250.00 6250
ya Adjusted income 2032.12 958.41 250.00 6250
f1 Health 7.50 1.59 0 10
f2 Education 6.96 1.67 0 10
f3 Social 7.65 1.32 0 10
f4 Environment 7.66 1.18 0 10
f5 Dummy retired 0.26 0 1
f6 Dummy unemployed 0.04 0 1
f7 Dummy unable to work 0.04 0 1
f8 Dummy housewife 0.01 0 1
f9 Dummy working 0.64 0 1
x1 Dummy female 0.53 0 1
x2 Age 48.89 16.89 18 91
x3 Number of children 0.82 1.14 0 8
x4 Family size 2.57 1.35 1 10
x5 Dummy children 0.27 0 1
x6 Dummy relationship 0.84 0 1
x7 Dummy religious 0.74 0 1
t1 Attitude 0.00 1.00 -3.37 2.96
t2 Conscientious -0.01 1.00 -3.91 2.95
t3 Solicitous 0.04 1.00 -3.29 3.19
t4 Expectant 0.03 1.00 -3.91 3.03
m Mood of the day 3.87 0.81 1 5
The individual characteristics refer to demographic aspects of the individual’s life: gender, age, the
number of children, having a relationship and being religious. There are four personality traits, numbers
between -3 and +3 calculated with factor analysis based on twelve personality related questions. The four
traits are attitude (t1), conscientious (t2), solicitous (t3) and expectant (t4)13. The respondents were also
asked to state their ‘mood of the day’ on a scale from 1 to 5.14
4.5 Empirical section
This section deals with the results. In paragraph 4.5.1, the six well-being measures are proposed. In
section 4.5.2 they are evaluated using the criteria from table 1. Paragraph 4.5.3 deals with the estimation
of the satisfaction and the possibilities specifications. Paragraphs 4.5.4 and 4.5.5 focus on the comparison
of well-being according to the measures.
13‘Attitude’ is based on extroverted, creative, optimistic, self-confident, progressive. ‘Conscientious’ is based on altruistic, meticu-
lous/dutiful, not envious. ‘Solicitous’ is based on worried, emotional. ‘Expectant’ is based on high expectations, never satisfied.
The results of the factor analysis are reported in appendix C.
14The question is “How is your mood today?” on a scale from 1 to 5.
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4.5.1 Satisfaction and possibilities measures
In this section, we translate the theoretical and empirical observations from the introduction into six well-
being measures based on satisfaction and possibilities. These measures fall in three categories: income,
self-reported information and equivalent income. The first two measures are family income yf and ad-
justed income ya. The third and the fourth measure are self-reported satisfaction s and self-reported
possibilities p. The fifth and the sixth measure are equivalent income measures, based on respectively
satisfaction and possibilities.
The satisfaction and possibilities estimations, needed for calculating equivalent income, are performed
in two specifications, once without and once with preference differences, in order to facilitate comparison.
In the first specification, self-reported satisfaction si and self-reported possibilities pi are regressed upon
the individuals’ achieved functionings, personality traits, demographic characteristics and their reported
mood of the day:
si = λs0 + λ
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estimated with OLS.15 Expressions (1) and (2) do not contain interactions, so here the assumption is made
that all individuals have the same preferences. The expressions with interactions are
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15An ordered logit or probit specification would be more interesting from a theoretical point of view, as the data are ordinal. Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have shown that for happiness data, the results of ordinary least squares are usually very similar to
the results of an ordered logit or probit.
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The coefficients with the interactions reflect differences in the marginal rates of substitution between
functionings and income. The disturbance terms in all the regressions (1)-(4) measures variation in sat-
isfaction or possibilities due to variation in unobserved explanatory variables – individual characteristics,
personality traits and functionings, inter-individual differences in calibration of the answers and noise.
With coefficient estimates of expression (3), individual i’s equivalent income based on satisfaction yi∗s
can be calculated as the amount of income that makes individual i indifferent between his actual situation
and a situation with reference functionings, f =
(
f1, ..., fM
) ∈ RM+ :
yi∗s = y
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Equivalent income is calculated by ‘moving’ individuals on the their indifference surface in the income-
functionings space. The relative value of each of the functionings depends on individual preferences.
With coefficient estimates of expression (4), individual i’s equivalent income based on possibilities
yi∗p can be calculated in the same way:
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In line with Fleurbaey et al. (2009), the reference values for functionings are taken such that they
represent the most favourable situation16. Interactions from expression (3) and (4) play a role in the
measures, the direct effects of individual characteristics and personality traits are not taken into account.
The equivalent income measure respects the individuals’ preferences differences, but does not take into
account their aspirations –the direct effects of individual characteristics and personality traits, and the
disturbance term. Note that individuals with the same characteristics and personality traits are assumed to
have the same preferences.
16For the first four functionings, this is a value of 10. For personal activities, it is the category ‘working’.
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4.5.2 Evaluation of the measures
In table 3 an evaluation is made of the different measures using the criteria from table 1. We do not pay
too much attention to yf and ya, as they merely serve as a reference. All measures except s and p fulfill
criteria 1 and 2. In self-reported satisfaction and possibilities, the mood of the day and aspirations play
a role. Equivalent income measures y∗s and y
∗
p correct for aspirations explicitly, the two income based
concepts do not depend on aspirations at all as they are not based on subjective information.
None of the proposed measures fulfills the unconditional dominance criterion. The two income con-
cepts do not depend on the achievement of other functionings and satisfaction and possibilities are sen-
sitive to aspirations, so an individual with higher functionings or income achievement might well have a
lower score on s or p. Equivalent income does not fulfill criterion 3 either, but it fulfills the conditional
dominance criterion 4. If preferences are the same, an individual with higher functionings and income
achievement will be judged better off. None of the other measures fulfills the conditional dominance
criterion.
Finally we deal with the respect for preferences criteria 5 and 6. Income obviously fulfills neither of
the criteria, as preferences differences do not play a role at all. Self-reported satisfaction and self-reported
possibilities only satisfy the conditional respect for preferences criterion. Equivalent income fulfills both
criteria, as aspirations are corrected for. Note the incompatibility between unconditional respect for pref-
erences and unconditional dominance.
Table 3: Criteria for well-being measures
Criterion yf ya s p y∗s y
∗
p
1 Independence of the mood of the day yes yes no no yes yes
2 Independence of aspirations yes yes no no yes yes
3 Unconditional dominance no no no no no no
4 Conditional dominance no no no no yes yes
5 Unconditional respect for preferences no no no no yes yes
6 Conditional respect for preferences no no yes yes yes yes
Both y∗s and y
∗
p are interesting candidates for a well-being measure, they both satisfy five of the six
criteria. Given the incompatibility, this is the maximum attainable. Below we investigate how sensitive
both measures are empirically for differential functionings and income achievement.
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4.5.3 Estimation results
The first two colums of table 4 contain the results of expression (1) with family income yf and adjusted
income ya. The third and the fourth column contain the estimation results of expression (2), again with yf
and ya. The two right-most columns contain the results of expressions (3) and (4), with interactions. The
reference category in the estimations is a working unreligious single man without children. Note that in
the two right-most columns, yf is taken as income measure. Family composition is measured by having a
relationship and the dummy for having children. Whether income has a linear or a non linear effect is an
empirical matter. Here, the linear specification has more explanatory power.
Table 4: Satisfaction and opportunities estimation results
Dependent variable s s p p s p
yf 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.084***
ya 0.059 0.086***
f1 Health 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.116*** -0.059
f2 Education 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.192*** 0.226***
f3 Social 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.131*** 0.168***
f4 Environment 0.245*** 0.246*** 0.182*** 0.183*** -0.092 0.188***
f5 Retired -0.242 -0.283* 0.065 0.298 -0.244 0.046
f6 unemployed -0.089 -0.128 -0.021 -0.047 -0.138 -0.072
f7 unable to work -0.562*** -0.586*** -0.029 -0.051 -0.540*** 0.063
f8 housewife -0.067 -0.091 0.007 -0.010 -0.021 0.011
x1 Dummy female 0.020 0.023 -0.028 -0.029 -0.013 -0.047
x2 Age -0.032** -0.026* -0.008 -0.002 -0.061*** -0.020
x2 ∗ x2 /1000 0.386*** 0.329** 0.090 0.030 0.335** 0.101
x5 Dummy children 0.228** 0.284*** 0.000 0.067 0.223** 0.007
x6 Dummy relationship 0.263** 0.314*** 0.134* 0.187** 0.261** 0.118
x7 Dummy religious 0.166* 0.163* 0.034 0.035 0.157* 0.047
t1 Attitude 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.020 0.022 0.122*** 0.016
t2 Conscientious 0.079** 0.081** -0.002 0.001 0.430** -0.007
t3 Solicitous 0.021 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.008
t4 Expectant -0.005 0.004 0.021 0.027 -0.002 0.027
f2 * age -0.002* -0.002***
f3 * t2 -0.047**
f4 * age 0.007***
f6 * t3 0.310*
f8 * t4 -0.329*
f1 * age 0.003***
f6 * t1 -0.185*
f7 * t1 0.498***
m Mood of the day 0.287*** 0.286*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.276*** 0.128***
Constant 1.964*** 1.879*** 2.486*** 2.324*** 3.626*** 3.070***
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.42
Note: Estimation results of expressions (1) and (2) are shown in the first four columns. The results of the estimation of expressions
(3) and (4) can be found in the two right-most columns. The dependent variables are self-reported satisfaction and self-reported
possibilities. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are denoted with ***, ** and * respectively.
Now we focus on some differences between the satisfaction estimations and the possibilities estima-
tions in the four left-most columns, the estimations without preference differences. First of all, note that,
whereas family income is significant in both cases, adjusted income is only significant in the possibilities
regression. This remains true also when family composition variables are left out of the specification –not
shown in the table. This is a surprising result, adjusted income comes much closer to the amount of wealth
per member of the family, apparently this does not bring satisfaction, but it brings possibilities. The re-
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sult might be due to a prestige effect. A higher family income brings prestige –living in a bigger house,
driving a bigger car– and thus more satisfaction, but if an income concept is taken that comes closer to the
disposable income per family member, the effect on satisfaction disappears.
One important difference between the two types of specifications is the relative contribution to the
explained variance of each of the groups of variables –functionings, individual characteristics, personality
traits and mood. In appendix D, the results of the variance decomposition of the estimation of expressions
(1) and (2) are provided. In the satisfaction regression, functionings and family income contribute to
around 61% of the explained variance, whereas for the possibilities regressions, these variables account
for 84% of the explained variance. The remaining variance in both cases is mostly explained by mood of
the day, be it more strongly in the case of satisfaction than in the case of possibilities. Personality traits
do not explain self-reported possibilities at all. This shows that self-reported possibilities depend more
on functionings achievement, as in Van Ootegem and Verhofstadt (2012). As such the result suggests that
self-reported possibilities are a more objective judgment about the individuals’ lives.
There are also some differences in the estimated coefficients of some of the functionings. Education
contributes more to possibilities than to satisfaction and living in a pleasant environment brings more
satisfaction than possibilities. This can be seen as evidence that the respondents perceive possibilities as
something different than satisfaction. Education increases an individual’s possibilities, as e.g. job market
opportunities may depend on education. Note that education is measured as the extent to which individuals
consider themselves well-educated, not in the classical way as the number of years of schooling. Of the
functioning ‘personal activities’ –functionings 5 to 9, those unable to work are less satisfied than the
working, but none of these variables has a significant impact on possibilities.
More important for our purposes are the effects of individual characteristics and personality traits. The
latter only play a role in the satisfaction regression, so we could say that satisfaction is more dependent on
the mental state of the individual than possibilities, in line with Van Ootegem and Verhofstadt (2012 and
2013). Individual characteristics have more effect on satisfaction than on possibilities, e.g. having children
and being religious increase satisfaction but do not influence possibilities. The same holds for age, where
there is a U-shaped relationship in the satisfaction regression, but no effect on possibilities. Only having
a relationship brings both satisfaction and possibilities.
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The mood of the day has a strong effect on both satisfaction and possibilities, though its coefficient is
twice as large and more significant in the former case than in the latter case. All this is evidence that the
respondents distinguish possibilities from satisfaction. The results concerning satisfaction are generally in
line with the existing satisfaction literature (see e.g. Dolan et al. (2006)).
Now we have a closer look at the results in the two right-most columns of table 4, with interactions.
Family income is used in the regression, as the coefficient with adjusted income is not significant in the
satisfaction regression. The direct effects of x and t in the regressions are interpreted as differences in
aspirations. None of these variables has a significant direct influence on the possibilities measure, but they
do influence satisfaction. This means that, empirically, aspirations do not play a statistically significant
role in the possibilities measure.
The interactions are interpreted as differences in preferences associated with individual characteristics
and personality traits. No interactions with income and health were found to be significant in the satis-
faction regression, and no interactions with income and the functioning social relations were found to be
significant in the possibilities regression. The interpretation is that there are no inter-individual differences
in preferences for these functionings.
Now we deal with funtionings achievement. Family income and all functionings have a significantly
positive effect on satisfaction for the reference individual, except the functioning ‘living in a pleasant
environment’. This functioning only enters in interaction with age, the older people get, the more this
functioning contributes to satisfaction17. Education is less preferred by older individuals18. There are
three interactions with personality traits: more conscientious people value the social functioning more,
the unemployed are less satisfied when they are unsolicitous and housewives are less satisfied when they
have high expectations.
In terms of possibilities, the functioning health does not have a significant effect for the reference
individual. It only enters in interaction with age, older people transform health into more possibilities.
17Note that the youngest individual in the sample is 18. The interaction coefficient is 0.007, so a unit of functioning f4 yields
0.007*18=0.126 units of satisfaction. The older people get, the higher this number is.
18The direct effect of a unit of f2 is 0.192. The reference individual is aged 0. For an individual of 18, the impact on satisfaction of
an extra unit of f2 is 0.192-18*0.002=0.156. As individuals get older, this impact decreases.
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Education yields less possibilities the older people get.19 The unemployed experience less possibilities
when they have a positive attitude and the unable to work achieve more possibilities when they have a
positive attitude.
The differences between the statistically significant interactions in the two columns on the right hand
side might be due to two things. First, we do not measure individual preferences, but group preferences20.
To the extent that our definition of the groups does not capture sufficiently the preferences of the individ-
uals in them, different interactions might appear significant in the two regressions. The second reason has
to do with data imperfections, people might make mistakes when answering the questions.
4.5.4 Comparing lives
Now we have six measures of well-being: the references of family income yf and adjusted income ya, one
measure proposed in the literature: self-reported satisfaction s, a measure proposed by Van Ootegem and
Verhofstadt (2013): self-reported possibilities p, and equivalent income y∗s and y
∗
p . First we have a look
at the Spearman rank correlations between these, provided in table 5. The correlations between income
and the other measures are relatively low, which points to the fact that a high income is no guarantee for a
high achievement of other functionings. If the measure of individual well-being is solely based on income,
other relevant aspects of life are clearly omitted. The low correlations between income and self-reported
satisfaction are striking and point to the fact that ranking individuals based on satisfaction is something
different than ranking them based on income. Both s and p correlate more with y∗s and y
∗
p .
The correlation between s and p is 0.487, which is considerable. It is interesting to not that the
correlation between fitted values of expressions (3) and (4) is around 23% –not shown in the table. This
means that there is correlation between the residuals of the estimations. This can be related to the above
discussion of the calibration problem. The result suggests that there might be an individual fixed effect
in the judgments of satisfaction and possibilities. An individual uses the same type of calibration for
deciding the answer to the satisfaction and to the possibilities question. As expected, y∗s and y
∗
p correlate
highly. Both measures are explicitly related to functionings achievement, in contrast to e.g. family income
19At the age of 18, a unit of f1 yields 0.054 units of possibilities and a unit of f2 yields 0.190 units of possibilities.
20Groups are based on personality traits and individual characteristics.
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or adjusted income. This explains the high correlation between them, as the only difference is the fact that
functionings are weighted in a different way.
Table 5: Spearman rank correlations between the indicators
yf ya s p y
∗
s y
∗
p
yf 1
ya 0.833 1
s 0.178 0.104 1
p 0.206 0.175 0.487 1
y∗s 0.358 0.331 0.474 0.596 1
y∗p 0.396 0.370 0.454 0.616 0.916 1
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Spearman rank order correlations are calculated between family income yf ,
adjusted income ya (family income divided by the square root of family size), self-reported satisfaction s with life,
self-possibilities p, equivalent income based on satisfaction y∗s (based on expression (5)) and equivalent income based on
possibilities y∗p (based on expression (6)).
In order to facilitate more specific inter-individual comparisons and comparisons across the measures,
average standardised scores are calculated21. Table 6 tabulates the average standardised scores of each
of the six measures, for individuals with high and low values for each of the functionings, individual
characteristics and the personality traits. High and low values for the functionings are chosen such that
each line in the table contains (at least) 15% of the respondents. For the dummy variables, high and low
values are naturally equal to 1 and 0. We have to be careful when interpreting the numbers in the table, as
they only allow for one-dimensional comparisons between measures. If the difference between high and
low is not significant, the box is left empty. The largest difference is underlined.
The first observation from the table is that the two measures on the right hand side are more responsive
to differences in functionings achievement than s and p, which are in turn more responsive than income.
This is due to the fact that y∗s and y
∗
p are constructed in order to take functionings achievement into
consideration. For health, education, the social functioning and being unemployed, the difference is
strongest in terms of y∗p ; for the environmental functioning and being unable to work, the difference is
strongest in terms of y∗s . Note that the numerical differences between these columns are often small.
Though s and p suffer from the influence of aspirations, the mood of the day and disturbance, they are
generally in line with the individuals’ functionings achievement. Self-reported possibilities p appear to be
more responsive to functionings differences than s, so if a self-reported measure is to be used as well-being
measure, then it is better to take possibilities than satisfaction.
In the two left-most columns, it can be seen that the income measures do not show a lot of varia-
21This is, for each measure, the value minus the average divided by the standard deviation.
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tion for high and low values of the first four functionings, except for high and low values of education
and the functioning personal activities. The former might be due to the connection between education
level and the type of job people have. The latter is due to the connection between income and having a
job. Retired people have clearly a lower income level compared to the other categories. Though, when
multidimensional well-being is the issue, focusing on income alone is clearly not sufficient.
Table 6: Average standardised scores of the well-being measures for high and low scores of functionings, individual
characteristics and personality traits
yf ya s p y
∗
s y
∗
p
yf Family income h 1.729 1.355 0.294 0.296 0.578 0.645
l -1.341 -1.078 -0.202 -0.340 -0.509 -0.541
ya Adjusted income h 1.330 1.825 0.108 0.122 0.457 0.494
l -1.209 -1.165 -0.214 -0.382 -0.557 -0.584
f1 Health h 0.213 0.227 0.380 0.510 0.769 0.872
l -0.292 -0.225 -0.613 -0.682 -1.095 -1.254
f2 Education h 0.497 0.521 0.424 0.725 0.900 1.060
l -0.499 -0.437 -0.475 -0.660 -0.950 -1.152
f3 Social h 0.068 0.191 0.470 0.605 0.866 0.871
l -0.307 -0.309 -0.589 -0.843 -1.140 -1.176
f4 Enviroment h -0.029 -0.031 0.547 0.663 1.084 0.916
l -0.232 -0.148 -0.670 -0.753 -1.259 -1.085
f5 Dummy retired 1 -0.717 -0.498 -0.065 -0.099 -0.370 -0.384
f6 Dummy unemployed 1 -0.544 -0.350 -0.481 -0.521 -0.427 -0.452
f7 Dummy unable to work 1 -0.030 -0.021 -0.738 -0.506 -1.203 -0.945
f8 Dummy housewife 1 -0.260 -0.153 -0.259 0.273 -0.035 -0.150
f9 Dummy working 1 0.339 0.233 0.111 0.102 0.258 0.251
x1 Dummy female 0 0.095 0.091
1 -0.084 -0.081
x2 Age ≥ 70 -0.882 -0.591 -0.171 -0.508 -0.554
≤ 27 0.023 0.765 0.165 0.483 0.424
x5 Dummy children 1 0.510 -0.137 0.133 0.143 0.160
0 -0.184 0.049 -0.048 -0.052 -0.058
x6 Dummy relationship 1 0.092 -0.034 0.072 0.048 0.047 0.042
0 -0.495 0.181 -0.387 -0.259 -0.253 -0.228
x7 Dummy religious 1 -0.065 -0.098 0.036 -0.029
0 0.189 0.283 -0.103 0.085
t1 Attitude h 0.111 0.033 0.317 0.318 0.386 0.460
l -0.190 -0.137 -0.373 -0.316 -0.461 -0.506
t2 Conscientious h -0.155 -0.195 0.231 0.142 0.318 0.083
l -0.003 0.199 -0.311 -0.198 -0.384 -0.190
t3 Solicitous h -0.253 -0.269 -0.179 -0.131 -0.242
l 0.204 0.179 0.106 0.127 0.145
t4 Expectant h 0.361 0.277 -0.004 0.027 0.055
l -0.286 -0.059 -0.170 -0.190 -0.155
Note: Adjusted income is family income divided by the square root of family size. Equivalent income y∗s is based on expression
(5), y∗p is based on expression (6). The numbers in the table provide the average standardised scores of each of the measures
(columns) for individuals belonging to the 15% highest or lowest values for each of the variables in the rows. If the difference
between the groups is not significant, the box is left empty.
As regards the individual characteristics, in the second block of the table, the largest differences appear
in the two left-most columns. Only for age, the equivalent income measures show some variation. This is
due to the interactions between functionings and age in table 4. The third block of the table contains the
differences in the measures for different personality traits. Both equivalent income and the possibilities
measure are quite responsive for the first two personality traits, which is due to the interactions from table
4. Note that the numbers in the three right-most columns almost all have the same sign. This might be
evidence that an individual’s personality has a real influence on his well-being and the things he reaches
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in life.
4.5.5 Who are the rich and the poor?
We are interested in a measure that is useful for policy recommendations, for instance to determine who
is to be considered poor. In this section we investigate the profile of the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’ for each
of the measures, with an approach put forward by de Barros et al. (2009). We investigate which type of
individuals are selected if the 15% worst-off and the 15% best-off according to the six measures are taken.
This is shown in table 7. Each column of the tables contains 15% of the sample with the highest and the
lowest values for each of the six measures.
Each cell in the table contains the average value for each of the functionings and individual character-
istics of the 15% best-off and worst-off, divided by the mean value –reported in table 2. A number higher
(lower) than 1 indicates that a value is higher (lower) than average in terms of functionings achievements,
and that a type of individuals is overrepresented (underrepresented) for the individual characteristics. The
values for the personality traits are not divided by their mean, as this is equal to zero. In terms of func-
tionings achievement, y∗s and y
∗
p provide the most pronounced picture, as the differences in functionings
achievement between high and low values of these measures are highest. As above, self-reported satis-
faction and possibilities perform better than the two income based measures. Both income measures do
not differentiate considerably in terms of functionings achievement, except for the functioning ‘personal
activities’ f5− f9. Note that also here p performs better than s in terms of differentiating rich and poor in
terms of functionings achievement.
The individual characteristics provide an interesting picture as well. Again, as in table 6, the dif-
ferences are biggest in the case of income. Women figure more in the low income categories in table 7,
though in terms of the other measures they are not ranked as worse-off. The average age in the low income
categories is considerably higher than in the high income categories. This is not surprising, as pensions
are generally lower than income. This difference also appears in the case of the equivalent income mea-
sures, though the difference in terms of s and p is smaller. Apparently income decreases with age, but this
does not hold for satisfaction or possibilities.
The unemployed are considered worse-off according to all measures. In terms of the other personal
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Table 7: Rich and poor according to each of the measures
yf ya s p y
∗
s y
∗
p
l h l h l h l h l h l h
yf 0.394 1.781 0.454 1.601 0.836 1.042 0.824 1.148 0.762 1.212 0.736 1.269
ya 0.492 1.639 0.451 1.861 0.916 1.017 0.864 1.101 0.775 1.223 0.767 1.272
f1 0.941 1.049 0.927 1.031 0.863 1.084 0.843 1.114 0.765 1.183 0.739 1.185
f2 0.910 1.114 0.900 1.102 0.882 1.078 0.830 1.152 0.779 1.192 0.736 1.237
f3 0.974 1.030 0.958 1.033 0.903 1.090 0.859 1.116 0.815 1.157 0.796 1.166
f4 0.980 1.026 0.975 1.009 0.887 1.073 0.878 1.102 0.801 1.175 0.828 1.144
f5 2.231 0.127 1.950 0.362 1.308 1.146 1.262 0.904 1.658 0.596 1.635 0.573
f6 1.975 0.425 2.175 0.875 2.150 0.575 2.400 0.600 1.875 0.575 2.000 0.425
f7 0.175 0.700 0.725 1.025 2.450 0.225 1.950 0.725 3.450 0.000 3.025 0.725
f8 1.800 0.600 2.900 1.800 2.000 1.900 1.800 2.900 1.700 1.700 1.100 0.600
f9 0.492 1.433 0.544 1.269 0.711 1.016 0.748 1.066 0.530 1.258 0.566 1.248
x1 1.089 0.875 1.136 0.866 1.011 1.079 0.964 0.966 0.975 1.062 1.008 1.085
x2 1.221 0.883 1.196 0.807 1.064 1.039 1.080 0.987 1.182 0.869 1.166 0.879
x5 0.084 0.587 0.263 0.172 0.224 0.294 0.271 0.337 0.245 0.322 0.217 0.365
x6 0.689 1.073 0.869 0.848 0.864 1.074 0.906 1.093 0.937 1.046 0.931 1.046
x7 1.074 0.911 1.089 0.850 0.954 1.059 0.984 0.993 1.026 1.032 1.095 0.970
t1 -0.228 0.189 -0.265 -0.013 -0.360 0.355 -0.401 0.422 -0.556 0.461 -0.592 0.434
t2 0.014 -0.015 -0.024 -0.286 -0.258 0.167 -0.182 0.286 -0.356 0.359 -0.126 0.240
t3 0.085 -0.279 0.181 -0.231 0.144 -0.054 0.177 -0.055 0.149 -0.031 0.267 -0.069
t4 -0.255 0.386 -0.244 0.178 -0.032 0.033 -0.077 0.141 0.018 0.109 -0.025 0.176
Note: Family income is yf , adjusted income ya is family income divided by the square root of family size. Self-reported
satisfaction with life is s and self-reported possibilities are p. The equivalent income measures y∗s and y∗p are based on expressions
(5) and (6) respectively. Functioning f1 is health, f2 is the functioning education, f3 is the social functioning and f4 is the
functioning living in a pleasant environment. Functionings 5-9 are respectively the dummies for retired, unemployed, unable to
work, housewife and working. The individual characteristics x1 is a dummy for female, x2 is age, x5 is the dummy for children,
x6 is the dummy for having a relationship and x7 is the dummy for religious. The personality trait variables are t1 attitude, t2
conscientious, t3 solicitous and t4 expectant. The numbers in the tables provide the averages of each of the row variables for
individuals in the high or low ranges of the column variables.
activities, the judgment depends on the type of measure taken. According to all measures except y∗p ,
the retired are categorised as worse-off and the working are considered as better-off. Housewives are
overrepresented in both the high- and the low- categories. The retired and the working do not differ in
terms of y∗p , though their income or satisfaction is lower. The unable to work are especially badly off in
terms of the four measures on the right-hand side, not in terms of income. Note that none of the unable to
work are categorised in the high-y∗s category.
Individuals without children or a relationship figure more in the low yf category, but after correcting
for family size, this is not the case anymore. Those without a relationship are overrepresented both in
the low and high-ya category. This is because, due to the correction for family size, singles end up in
the high-ya category and individuals in large families in the low-ya category. Note that those individuals
without a relationship are worse off according to all measures. Having children does not affect the other
well-being measures. Finally, the results concerning the personality traits, in the bottom four rows of
table 7, show that the satisfied, those with high y∗s and those with high y
∗
p have a more positive attitude
and are more conscientious.
The analysis makes clear that evaluating individuals in terms of y∗p is a legitimate way to evaluate
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well-being. It fulfills the same formal criteria as y∗s , and performs empirically as well in deciding about
who is better or worse off. When well-being is judged in terms of possibilities, different individuals are
considered as poor. Information on possibilities might complement judgements based on other measures
such as equivalent income.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we hypothesized that another overarching evaluation question, self-reported possibilities,
could overcome some of the problems with self-reported satisfaction information. Self-reported satisfac-
tion information suffers from two problems: its dependence on aspirations and its dependence on affects.
The aim was to investigate consequences of this idea empirically using the dimensions of functionings
proposed by Stiglitz et al. (2009). Two possibilities measures were evaluated: self-reported possibil-
ities and equivalent income based on self-reported possibilities. These measures were compared with
four other well-being measures used in the literature: family income, income adjusted for family size,
self-reported satisfaction and equivalent income based on satisfaction. This comparison is based on a
number of formal criteria. It is shown that equivalent income fulfills some interesting formal criteria for a
well-being measure that the other measures do not fulfill.
We argue that there is a conceptual difference between self-reported satisfaction with life and self-
reported possibilities. The effects of individual characteristics and personality traits are to be given a
different interpretation. They serve as determinants of preferences. We side with those who argue that
inter-individual differences in preferences should be taken into account in a good measure of well-being,
if these are not flawed. A well-being measure that does not respect these inter-individual differences is
paternalistic, which is considered less interesting from a normative point of view, as it might go against
individuals’ own point of view about what matters in their lives.
In the empirical section, the differences between satisfaction and possibilities are investigated. It is
shown that education provides more possibilities, while living in a pleasant environment brings more
satisfaction. Further, compared to self-reported satisfaction, self-reported possibilities depend less on
individual characteristics and not at all on personality traits. Especially the latter observation is interesting
for our purposes, as it shows that self-reported possibilities are perceived as something more objective
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than satisfaction with life. Self-reported possibilities are more responsive to differences in functionings
achievement than self-reported satisfaction. This is bad news for those who see satisfaction with life as a
good way to evaluate well-being.
The equivalent income measures respond more to differences in functionings achievement than the
four other measures. Equivalent income based on possibilities performs slightly better than equivalent
income based on satisfaction in differentiating between those with higher and lower functionings achieve-
ment. The possibilities poor in our sample are predominantly the unemployed and those unable to work,
and individuals without a relationship, whereas in terms of the other measures, the retired are also con-
sidered as badly off. Apparently these individuals are not possibilities poor, though they are income poor
or equivalent income poor. We conclude that equivalent income based on possibilities might well serve as
an interesting measure for policy purposes.
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Appendix A - Questionnaire
Possibilities: How are the possibilities for you... (on a scale from 0 (completely insufficient) to 10
(excellent))
1. to find happiness in your life?
2. that you have to reach achievements in your life?
3. that you have to live a healthy life?
4. with respect to education and training that you have access to?
5. to achieve enough income?
6. to have a satisfying social life?
7. to be in pleasant environments?
8. that you have to live according to your personal opinion and way of thinking?
9. to decide the direction of your life in your situation?
10. to decide the direction of your life in your relationship?
11. in general?
Functionings: What have you reached in your life... (on a scale from 0 (completely disagree) to 10
(completely agree))
1. in general I lead a happy life.
2. given my age, I have reached many of my goals.
3. I consider myself to be in good health.
4. I consider myself well-educated.
5. my (family) income is sufficient to live a good life.
6. I have a good social life (friends, clubs,...)
7. I live and spend my time in pleasant environments (life, work, nature,...)
8. I respect my personal vision when taking decisions.
9. I am satisfied with my current life situation (studying, working, retired,...)
10. I am satisfied with my relationship.
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Appendix B: Criteria for well-being measures
In this appendix the criteria from section 4.2 are written formally. Denote a measure of individual i’s
well-being by W
(
f i, yi, Ri, Ai,mi
)
. We introduce the following notation: mi ∈ M ⊆ R+, whereM
is the set of all possible levels of the mood of the day; Ai ∈ A ⊆ R+, where A is the set of all possible
levels of aspirations and Ri ∈ R, whereR is the set of all possible preferences.
The first feature of a good well-being measure is that it does not depend on temporary influences such
as the mood of the day.
Criterion 1: Independence of the mood of the day:
If
(
f i, yi
)
Ri
(
f i′, yi′
)
, then it must be that for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, Ri, Ai,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, Ri, Ai,m) .
In the following criteria, we leave the mood of the day out of consideration. The second criterion deals
with aspirations. A sound well-being measure is to be independent of the individuals’ frame of reference,
thus it should not depend on their aspirations.
Criterion 2: Independence of aspirations:
If
(
f i, yi
)
Ri
(
f i′, yi′
)
, then it must be that for all A ∈ A and for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, Ri, A,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, Ri, A,m) .
Criteria 3 and 4 deal with dominance. A well-being measure satifies dominance if it is increasing
in functionings and income. We distinguish between conditional and unconditional dominance. Uncon-
ditional dominance means that dominance holds for individuals with different preferences; conditional
dominance means that dominance holds conditional on the fact that the individuals have the same pref-
erences. Obviously, if a measure satisfies unconditional dominance, it automatically satisfies conditional
dominance.
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Criterion 3, unconditional dominance, can be written as
If
(
f i, yi
) ≥ (f i′, yi′) , then it must be that
for all A ∈ A, for all R ∈ R and for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, R,A,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, R,A,m) .
Criterion 4, conditional dominance, can be written as
If
(
f i, yi
) ≥ (f i′, yi′) , then it must be that for all A ∈ A and for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, Ri, A,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, Ri, A,m) .
Criteria 5 and 6 deal with respect for preferences differences. We differentiate between conditional
and unconditional respect for preferences (see Schokkaert et al. (2011)). Conditional respect for prefer-
ences means that if two individuals are compared, their preferences are respected on the condition that
their aspirations are the same. It allows inter-individual comparisons of individuals with the same aspira-
tions. Unconditional respect means that two individuals can be compared also if their aspirations differ.
Obviously, if the unconditional respect criterion is fulfilled, the conditional respect criterion is fulfilled.
Criterion 5 unconditional respect for preferences
If
(
f i, yi
)
Ri
(
f i′, yi′
)
, then it must be that, for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, Ri, Ai,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, Ri, Ai′,m) .
Criterion 6 conditional respect for preferences
If
(
f i, yi
)
Ri
(
f i′, yi′
)
, then it must be that, for all m ∈M :
W
(
f i, yi, Ri, Ai,m
) ≥W (f i′, yi′, Ri, Ai,m) .
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Appendix C - Factor analysis
Respondents were asked to score themselves on a numeric 7-point scale between 3/2/1/0/1/2/3 on
12 personality related opposites: introverted-extroverted, selfish-altruistic, not meticulous/dutiful-very
meticulous/dutiful, not worrying-worrying a lot, easily satisfied-never satisfied, not creative-very creative,
pessimistic-optimistic, little self confidence-confident, rational-emotional, conservative-progressive, not
envious-envious and low expectations-high expectations. Using principal components anaylysis, the
twelve personality related variables were reduced to four factors (the t variables in the paper). The number
of factors is not determined in advance, but those factors with eigenvalues higher than 1 have been kept.
These four factors explain together 56% of the the variance in the 12 personality related variables.
The table below contains the rotated component matrix
Table C1: Rotated component matrix
t1 Attitude t2 Conscientious t3 Solicitous t4 Expectant
Extroverted 0.591 0.176 0.162 -0.065
Altruistic 0.177 0.644 0.340 -0.067
Meticulous 0.079 0.624 0.151 0.537
Worrying a lot -0.178 0.144 0.650 0.456
Never satisfied -0.070 -0.285 0.017 0.703
Very creative 0.524 -0.024 0.218 0.051
Optimistic 0.705 0.316 -0.155 -0.132
Self confident 0.668 0.131 -0.361 0.049
Emotional 0.247 0.026 0.777 -0.118
Progressive 0.630 -0.215 0.181 0.099
Envious 0.007 -0.679 0.163 0.231
High expectations 0.506 0.015 -0.116 0.546
‘Attitude’ t1 is based on extroverted, creative, optimistic, self-confident, progressive. ‘Conscientious’
t2 is based on altruistic, meticulous/dutiful, not envious. ‘Solicitous’ t3 is based on worried, emotional.
‘Expectant’ t4 is based on high expectations, never satisfied.
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Appendix D - Variance decomposition
In order to investigate the joint contribution of functionings/income, individual characteristics, per-
sonality traits and mood, a variance decomposition analysis is performed for the estimations of the first
and the third columns of table 4. Table D1 provides the percentages contributed by each group of variables
in the explained variance of satisfaction and possibilities respectively.
Table D1: Variance decomposition of expression (1)
s p
Family income and functionings 0.610 0.842
Individual characteristics 0.062 0.008
Personality traits 0.029 0.002
Mood 0.081 0.025
Covariance yf / f and x -0.051 0.001
Covariance yf / f and t 0.078 0.019
Covariance yf / f and mood 0.140 0.097
Covariance x and t 0.006 0.000
Covariance x and mood 0.016 0.004
Covariance t and mood 0.028 0.002


